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“Happiness research” studies the correlates of
subjective well-being, generally through survey
methods. A number of psychologists and social
scientists have drawn upon this work recently to
argue that the American model of relatively limit-
ed government and a dynamic market economy
corrodes happiness, whereas Western European
and Scandinavian-style social democracies pro-
mote it. This paper argues that happiness
research in fact poses no threat to the relatively
libertarian ideals embodied in the U.S. socioeco-
nomic system. Happiness research is seriously
hampered by confusion and disagreement about
the definition of its subject as well as the limita-
tions inherent in current measurement tech-
niques. In its present state happiness research
cannot be relied on as an authoritative source for
empirical information about happiness, which, in
any case, is not a simple empirical phenomenon
but a cultural and historical moving target. Yet,
even if we accept the data of happiness research at
face value, few of the alleged redistributive policy
implications actually follow from the evidence.
The data show that neither higher rates of gov-
ernment redistribution nor lower levels of income
inequality make us happier, whereas high levels of
economic freedom and high average incomes are
among the strongest correlates of subjective well-
being. Even if we table the damning charges of
questionable science and bad moral philosophy,
the American model still comes off a glowing suc-
cess in terms of happiness.
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Introduction:
Is the United States a
Failure?
“There is a paradox at the heart of our lives,”
writes Richard Layard, head of the London
School of Economics Center for Economic
Performance and member of the British House
of Lords. “As Western societies have got richer,”
Layard tells us, “their people have become no
happier.”1 Psychologist of happiness David
Myers opens his book, The American Paradox,
on a Dickensian note: “It is the worst of times,
and the best of times.” We owe the “worst of
times,” according to Myers, to “radical individ-
ualism” and “libertarianism,” both civil and
economic.2 Journalist Gregg Easterbrook puts
it this way: “We live in a favored age and do not
feel favored.”3 His bestselling book, The Progress
Paradox, set out to explain “why capitalism and
liberal democracy, both of which justify them-
selves on the grounds that they produce the
greatest happiness for the greatest number,
leave so much dissatisfaction in their wake.”4
All of those works and many more tap into
a rapidly growing body of research on the cor-
relates of human happiness. Starting roughly
with University of Southern California econo-
mist Richard Easterlin’s watershed 1973 paper
showing that average happiness levels report-
ed by Americans had not risen for decades
despite a doubling in average incomes, econo-
mists, sociologists, and psychologists have
been busy canvassing the world, handing out
“life satisfaction” surveys and customized
“experience sampling” Palm Pilots and then
running the data through computers with
cutting-edge statistical software to tease out
the determinants of a satisfying life.5
How important is wealth to happiness?
How important is marriage? Parenthood? Job
satisfaction? Leisure time? Health? The rate
of unemployment? The rate of economic
growth? Democratic institutions? Social safe-
ty nets? The happiness researchers even have
their own journal, The Journal of Happiness
Studies, where all of this, and more, is analyzed
at length. 
Layard is sufficiently confident in the qual-
ity of happiness research to bless it as a “new
science.” It is claimed that we now know, at
long last, what really makes people happy.
Geoffrey Miller, a psychologist at the Univers-
ity of New Mexico, writes: “In the last ten years,
psychology has finally started to deliver the
goods—hard facts about what causes human
happiness.”6 Scholars like Layard have not hes-
itated to base dramatic policy recommenda-
tions on our alleged newfound facts. Layard
argues, for example, that a government that
cares about the pursuit of happiness will levy
higher taxes on income, impose strict controls
on advertising and marketing, mandate gener-
ous periods of paid parental leave, and imple-
ment “radical” mandatory public school
courses covering aspects of life generally left to
parents aiming “to produce a happier genera-
tion of adults than the current generation,”
and much else besides.7
Layard’s belief that happiness research sup-
ports the policies of more heavily regulated
markets and a more thoroughgoing egalitarian
welfare state is by no means unique. Indeed, it
appears to have become a sort of conventional
wisdom among those who study happiness. In
an academic paper about the evolutionary psy-
chology of happiness (and not about the politics
of happiness), psychiatrist Rudolph Nesse, ref-
erencing the work of Layard and Cornell
University economist Robert Frank, reports in
passing what he takes to be the established
political implications of happiness research: 
On a social and political level, it is
abundantly clear that certain policies
can increase average SWB [subjective
well-being] in a society. More equitable
income distribution is highly correlated
with the average level of well-being in a
society, and high taxes on high incomes
and luxury goods would result in only
infinitesimal decrements in the posi-
tional pleasures provided by luxury
goods. Most democratic societies seem
unable, however, to enact laws based on
this knowledge to increase the well-
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Notre Dame University political scientist
Benjamin Radcliff argues that market-orient-
ed societies are by nature corrosive to happi-
ness and that large welfare states are the rem-
edy. Publishing in his field’s most prominent
journal, Radcliff claims that the accumulated
data suggest: 
Life satisfaction should increase as we
move from less to more social democra-
tic welfare states. More generally, life
satisfaction should vary positively with
the dominance in government of politi-
cal parties committed to the social
democratic program of limiting human
dependence on the market.9
Elsewhere Radcliff argues that “the more we
supplement the cold efficiency of the free mar-
ket system with interventions that reduce
poverty, insecurity and inequality, the more we
improve the quality of life.”10 Like Layard,
Nesse, and Radcliff, many others believe it has
been established that certain policies—policies
that would make the United States more like
Sweden or France—would enhance our happi-
ness. “The utilitarian argument for the rich giv-
ing more of their money to the poor is now sci-
entifically irrefutable,” writes Geoffrey Miller,
“but few journalists have recognized that revo-
lutionary implication.”11 Swarthmore College
psychologist Barry Schwartz, writing in the
New Republic, says that thanks to happiness
research “we now know there is some signifi-
cant subset of people likely to be made better
off through heavier taxation, and that these
people reside at the top end of the wealth dis-
tribution.” Schwartz continues:
Given that a concern for people’s welfare
has traditionally been one of the chief
moral objections to taxing wealth (at
least among those sympathetic to redis-
tribution in principle), a policy of heavier
taxation for the very wealthy may be the
only moral course of action.12
An article on happiness research in the New
York Times reports that George Loewenstein, a
leader in “behavioral economics” at Carnegie
Mellon University, “doesn’t see how anybody
could study happiness and not find himself
leaning left politically.”13
Perhaps the most compelling left-leaning
arguments based on happiness research are
those, such as Robert Frank’s in his book
Luxury Fever, which de-emphasize the impor-
tance of absolute material wealth to happiness
and stress instead the importance of relative
position in the distribution of income and
social status. Whereas happiness research has
shown a flat trend in happiness over time, it
also shows that at any time wealthier people are
more likely to say they are happy. However, so
the argument goes, if we all run harder to pull
ahead in the race for the benefits of higher rel-
ative standing, those ahead will just run hard-
er too. In the end, the frantic pace will have left
us all harried and exhausted, and average hap-
piness will have remained unchanged.
“Every time [some people] raise their rela-
tive income (which they like),” Layard writes,
“they lower the relative income of other people
(which those people dislike). This is an ‘exter-
nal disbenefit’ imposed on others, a form of
physical pollution.”14 Layard’s proposed solu-
tion is a tax on “the polluting activity” or, as
economists call it, the “negative externality.”
The polluting activity here is nothing less than
your and my working hard to make more
money. But, if it is relative standing that mat-
ters, the increase in total wealth will not
increase happiness on average. There will
always be a top half and bottom half. A tax
that reduces the monetary benefits of labor
and so encourages everyone to ease up in uni-
son will slow the pace of life and reduce
incomes. This, the argument goes, will do no
harm to happiness, but the time and energy
freed to pursue the pleasures of family, friends,
and leisure will do a world of good. 
If we must push ourselves ever harder
merely to keep up, then it is easy to suspect
that the output of increased economic pro-
duction will not actually contribute to our
happiness. We end up with nothing but super-
fluous abundance, the side-effect of a mad














hollow us out, even as it sedates us with the
spurious satisfactions of unending novelty.
This is a powerful and compelling line of
reasoning, in the light of which it becomes
easy to understand why the importance of
economic growth has taken a beating by a
number of prominent happiness scholars. In
an article entitled “The Hippies Were Right
about Happiness,” Warwick University eco-
nomics professor Andrew Oswald writes:
Routinely derided, the ideas of these
down-to-earth philosophers are being
confirmed by new statistical work by
psychologists and economists. . . . Once
a country has filled its larders, there is no
point in that nation becoming richer. . . .
Economists’ faith in the value of growth
is diminishing. That is a good thing and
will slowly make its way down into the
minds of tomorrow’s politicians.15
The Declaration of Independence states that
“all men are created equal,” vested with rights to
“Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”
The apparent consensus among happiness
researchers strongly suggests that America has
failed to live up to its founding ideals.
Happiness research may seem to pose a grave
threat to the legitimacy of the relatively libertar-
ian American political-economic model.
The threat hits home with a vengeance
when we recall that the Declaration was not
just a statement of national ideals but an
incendiary argument aimed at the justifica-
tion of rebellion—a radical case for overthrow-
ing the government. According to the Dec-
laration, “whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these ends” (i.e., life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) “it is the
Right of the People to alter or abolish it,” and
replace it with a government they feel sure will
“effect their Safety and Happiness.” In other
words, if a government actively interferes with
its citizens’ pursuit of happiness, it has no
legitimate authority, and citizens are justified
in scrapping it and starting over. A failing
grade on the “American test” of happiness is a
call for massive reform, if not outright revolt.
The task of this paper is to examine the
state of happiness research and grade the per-
formance of the United States on its own
test. Has the nation’s relatively dynamic,
competitive, free-market system failed us in
the pursuit of happiness? Has “science”
shown that the ideals of free markets and
limited government deserve retirement? If we
would in fact be happier as denizens of an
egalitarian welfare state on the model of
European social democracies, it may seem
that only the ignorant or spiteful would try
to stand in the way of happier lives and a bet-
ter grade on the American test.  So we have to
ask: Would we be right to scrap our current
system and start over?
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that
happiness research poses no threat to U.S.
ideals as they have been historically interpreted
and are embodied (albeit imperfectly) in our
present socioeconomic system. Happiness
research is seriously hampered by confusion
and disagreement about the definition of its
subject as well as the limitations inherent in
current measurement techniques. Happiness
research in its present state cannot be relied on
as an authoritative source for empirical infor-
mation about happiness, which, in any case, is
not a simple empirical phenomenon but a cul-
tural and historical moving target. Further-
more, happiness is not the only element of
human well-being or of a valuable life. At the
very least, believing that it is has no standing as
a scientific proposition, and there is no liberal
moral justification for holding up happiness as
the sole standard for evaluating policy in a con-
tentiously pluralistic society. Yet the problems
with the political uses of happiness research
run deeper than methodology. Even if we grant
that the findings of happiness research do shed
some light on the state of human well-being,
few of the main alleged implications for public
policy actually follow from a fair reading of the
evidence. In a nutshell: even if we put aside
charges of questionable science and bad moral
philosophy, the United States still comes off as
a glowing success in terms of happiness. If any
nation deserves an “A” on the “American test,”
the United States does. 
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Though the putative implications of hap-
piness research touch on almost all areas of
life and public policy, this paper focuses on
three major claims:
(1) The relatively greater dynamism of the
U.S. market economy and the relative-
ly smaller scope of the U.S. welfare
state are bad for happiness, and we
would be happier with European-style
social democracy.
(2) The importance of relative position to
happiness provides a justification for
higher taxes on income and/or con-
sumption.
(3) Economic growth is unimportant to
happiness, and measures of social wel-
fare such as GDP per capita (or growth
in GDP per capita) should be replaced
or at least augmented with measures
of happiness. 
Before explaining why each of these claims
is false, I will discuss how happiness research is
currently conducted, what it says, and why it
tells us less than its defenders think.
The Limits of Happiness
Research
Happiness research is a label for a wide
range of research programs that aim to uncov-
er the correlates or causal determinants of
happiness, life-satisfaction, or subjective well-
being (commonly abbreviated as SWB). For
the most part, happiness researchers—usually
economists, psychologists, and sociologists—
rely on data gathered from large surveys in
which people report how they are feeling, as
well as how much money they make, how
many children they have, what kind of job
they have, and so forth. Researchers then
search for patterns in relationships between
answers about happiness and answers about
money, children, work, and so forth, using a
wide variety of statistical techniques. 
Surveys are fairly blunt instruments for
probing into people’s psyches. “Taken all
together, how happy would you say you are:
very happy, quite happy, not very happy, or not
at all happy?” is a typical question that appears
on the widely used World Values Survey.16
Other surveys, such as those conducted by the
National Opinion Research Center, use slight-
ly different wording and a three-point scale.
There are also multi-item surveys, such as the
one included in the Midlife Development
Inventory, that ask about the frequency of pos-
itive and negative feelings17 and the popular
multi-item Satisfaction with Life Scale created
by University of Illinois psychologist Ed
Diener.18 Some surveys, such as the Eurobar-
ometer survey, ask how “satisfied,” instead of
how “happy,” the respondent is with his or her
life.
Though broad-brush surveys dominate
the field of happiness research at present,
there are other, more fine-grained self-report
techniques. The experience sampling method
(ESM) was pioneered by psychologist Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi, best known for his work
on peak experience or “flow.”19 ESM equips
volunteers with beepers or specially outfitted
handheld computers programmed to sound
an alert at random intervals throughout the
day, at which point the volunteer is supposed
to makes note of what he is doing and how
he feels while doing it. Because ESM can be
very expensive for large samples, recent stud-
ies have begun to use the Day Reconstruction
Method, created by economics Nobel Prize-
winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman and
others, as a substitute.20 Volunteers in DRM
studies are asked to spend time at the end of
the day recalling and recording their activi-
ties during the day along with what they were
feeling while performing them.
Even more promising, the development of
medical diagnostic technology such as brain
imaging and the isolation of hormones in
blood samples now allows us to measure
directly the organic underpinnings of good
and bad feelings. There is a wide array of neu-
rotransmitters and hormones, such as
dopamine, serotonin, oxytocin, cortisol, pro-
lactin, and many more that may contribute to







that attempt to directly measure the physical
basis of well-being, but, so far, they are very
few—in large part because they are very expen-
sive. The recent work of University of
Wisconsin psychologist Carol Ryff and her
team of investigators stands out as an example
of happiness research that integrates brain
imaging and biochemical evidence with survey
research.21 Though such research efforts are
difficult, time-consuming, and expensive, they
promise to advance our understanding of
happiness considerably and deserve greater
attention and emulation.
Much of the happiness literature is occu-
pied with examining the relative merits of
three hypotheses (or combinations thereof)
that seek to explain the so-called “Easterlin
Paradox”—the fact that average self-reported
happiness has not risen with average income.
The “adaptation-set point” hypothesis says
that each of us has a settled disposition to
feel a certain way (our largely genetically
determined happiness “set point”) and that
we quickly “adapt” or habituate” psychologi-
cally to both pleasurable and painful events,
reverting eventually to that usual set point.22
The “aspiration adjustment” hypothesis—
Easterlin’s own favored explanation—makes
sense of the flat happiness trend by noting
that people tend to raise their aspirations as
soon as they have met their old ones. If self-
reported happiness is an individual’s assess-
ment of their position relative to their aspira-
tions, a penchant for constantly “shifting the
goal-posts” will ensure people rarely say they
are getting happier.23 Last, as we’ve already
noted, there is the “relative position” hypoth-
esis, which claims that self-reported happi-
ness is a function of our relative position in a
social hierarchy. Since that hierarchy is often
identified with income distribution, the rela-
tive position hypothesis is taken by many to
explain why increases in average income
don’t correlate strongly with increases in
average happiness.24
Opposed to each of these theses is the
“absolute effect” hypothesis, which states that
increases in material well-being have real and
lasting effects on happiness—effects that we
don’t simply get used to psychologically, that
don’t diminish in light of shifting aspirations,
and that aren’t sensitive to social comparison.
The absolute effect hypothesis is not an expla-
nation of the Easterlin Paradox, but rather a
denial of it. In other words, it is the claim that
happiness has increased significantly with
income and wealth.
It is not my purpose here to sort out the rel-
ative explanatory power of the “adaptation-set
point” and “aspiration adjustment” hypothe-
ses. This paper does argue, however, that there
is some absolute effect of wealth and income
not subject to adaptation and aspiration shift-
ing and that the importance of relative posi-
tion is dramatically overblown. But if there are
continuous real effects of increasing material
well-being, then why are they so hard to see? 
Problems with Surveys
The first question that occurs to most
people when encountering survey-based hap-
piness research is whether everyone thinks of
“happiness” in the same way and whether we
judge our own level of satisfaction according
to the same standards. Doesn’t everyone have
his own notion of happiness? Isn’t this way of
measuring subjective well-being too . . . sub-
jective? Happiness scholars generally point to
the same small set of studies that show some
correlation with self-reported happiness and
other things we might imagine to be objec-
tive manifestations of happiness, such as
increased blood-flow in certain parts of the
brain, smiling a lot, or being rated as happy
by one’s friends and family. However, these
checks on the validity of happiness surveys
are only as good as the thinking behind
them, and some of the thinking isn’t very
impressive. For example, people in some cul-
tures just seem to smile more than others,
and there is evidence that “authentic” smiles
function more as social cues than as raw
physical expressions of individual emotion,
so it is hard to know how much confirmation
of survey data is provided by noting that peo-
ple who say they are happier smile more.25
Other happiness researchers dispute the
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large numbers, which guarantees that ran-
dom variations are washed out with an ade-
quately large and representative sample.26
But a great deal of variation seems not to
be random at all. For example, it is not clear
that all cultures understand “happiness” the
same way Americans, or Westerners more
generally, do. And, if it needs to be said, the
properties of being American or being
Chinese, for example, are not randomly dis-
tributed throughout the human population.
Cultural characteristics can matter for the
way people respond to surveys, even in the
unlikely event that cultural differences break
along political boundaries.
With a few notable exceptions, it has so far
been rare to encounter any acknowledge-
ment that survey measures track anything
but a universal and ahistorical form of expe-
rience or that different languages might
express these experiences differently. 
Australian National University linguist
Anna Wierzbicka—perhaps the world’s lead-
ing authority on the ways different languages
express emotion—says, “The glibness with
which linguistic differences are at times
denied in the current literature on happiness
can be quite astonishing.”27 According to
Wierzbicka, “It is an illusion . . . to think that
the English words happy and happiness have
exact semantic equivalents in Chinese or, for
that matter, in other European languages.”28
She does not argue that cross-cultural and
linguistic comparisons of self-reported sub-
jective states are hopeless, but that cross-cul-
tural and linguistic comparisons of self-
reported happiness are. The English words
“happy” and “happiness” do not have exact
counterparts in every language, and they
express sets of cultural expectations and
ideals about the experience and expression of
emotions that are not universal. “To be able
to interpret self-reports across cultures,” she
writes, “one needs a methodology for explor-
ing cultural norms that may guide the inter-
viewees in their responses.”29
Psychologists Ed Diener and Shigehiro
Oishi find that Confucian-influenced Asian
nations report lower levels of average self-
reported happiness than would be expected
from their levels of wealth and the quality of
their political institutions, whereas many
Latin American countries post what seem to
be inflated happiness scores, a difference they
admit “could be influenced by response bias-
es rather than actual experience. For example,
the Japanese [who score unusually low on
surveys] might not want to stand out from
their group by saying they are very happy.”30
They note that psychological and cultural
“norms for feeling emotions, and the desire
to fulfill the high expectations of others, can
also have an effect” on happiness surveys.31
Of course, there is also cultural hetero-
geneity within societies, with some societies
being more heterogeneous than others. It
would seem to follow that nations like the
United States, which absorb high numbers of
immigrants from every part of the world, will
yield samples that contain a large degree of
nonrandom cultural variation in the way
happiness survey questions are interpreted
and answered. It’s worth emphasizing again
that the political boundaries of modern
states may or may not fall along national,
ethnic, or cultural lines. 
Cultural heterogeneity aside, economist
Andrew Clark and coauthors have found that
there is, in any case, a good deal of patterned
diversity not only in the way people within
societies translate variables like income into
happiness, but in the way they express their
happiness level in speech and on self-report-
ed surveys.32
Suppose, for example, you and I both
make $50,000 per year, and we both report
our happiness level as a 7 on a scale from 1 to
10. However, the fact that we circled the same
number on the survey guarantees neither
that we are equally happy nor that income
affects our happiness equally. Suppose fur-
ther that your level of satisfaction at $50,000
a year is what mine would be at $70,000 (hold-
ing other things equal). So I am, in fact, less
satisfied than you are with the same income
and life as a whole (since other things are
equal). However, for some reason (cultural













ferences in goals or expectations, different
personality types, or whatever), our internal
standards for translating feelings into lan-
guage differ, so we end up reporting the same
level of happiness despite the fact we do not
feel the same. 
Given the same input to experience (e.g., a
certain income, a certain number of hours
spent watching television, etc.), people can
feel the same thing but talk about it different-
ly. Harvard psychologist Dan Gilbert calls
this “language-squishing.” Or people can feel
differently, but talk about it the same way.
Gilbert call this “experience stretching.” “The
fundamental problem in the science of expe-
rience,” Gilbert writes,
is that if either the language-squishing
or the experience-stretching hypothe-
sis is correct, then every one of us may
have a different mapping of what we
say—and because subjective experi-
ences can be shared only by saying, the
true nature of those experiences can-
not be perfectly measured.33
Gilbert attempts to solve the problem by
appealing to the law of large numbers: “when
[the number of individuals in the sample]
becomes two hundred or two thousand, the
different calibrations of these individuals
begin to cancel one another out.”34 As we’ve
noted, the law of large numbers works when
it washes out random variations in properties
that are not systematically correlated with
one another (i.e., that are “independent.”)
However, if variation is nonrandom within a
group—if, say, tendencies of language-squish-
ing and experience-stretching tend to associ-
ate with other nonrandom properties—the
overall average may be largely useless, convey-
ing inaccurate information about every sub-
group. It may be that the average weight of a
group of Chihuahuas and mastiffs (we don’t
know how many of each) is 36 pounds, but
it’s not very helpful to know this. This sort of
mixed sample is what Clark and coauthor’s
have in mind when they note that “our
results suggest that the blind aggregation of
diverse populations risks producing empiri-
cal results that are false for everybody.”35
In their study, Clark and his team “show
that people are different,” and not randomly
so, as they tend to fall into different classes of
happiness survey response in predictable pat-
terns based on a number of personal and
demographic variables. Though they are
unable to tease out which people fall into
each class due to language-squishing and/or
experience stretching, they are able to
“strongly reject the hypothesis that individu-
als carry out these joint transformations
[from income to experience and experience
to self-reported happiness] in the same way.”
This leads them to conclude that “aggregat-
ing data across diverse populations may be a
dangerous practice.” They write that “indi-
viduals who seem to fall naturally into a
number of different classes differ in ways
that are far more complicated” than those
picked up by studies that control for the
effect of simple individual differences on
happiness.36
In addition to systematic differences
between individuals, the way people report
their happiness is highly sensitive to context,
threatening the reliability of surveys. In a
series of  papers, philosopher Dan Haybron
has argued that life satisfaction judgments
are highly labile and perspective dependent.
Quite appropriately, people have different
standards for assessing how well things are
going, and they may employ different stan-
dards in different sorts of circumstances. The
way we answer a question about how satis-
fied we are with life as a whole will depend on
the standard that happens to be active at the
time. “We are all familiar,” Haybron writes, 
with the tendency we have to waver
between appraising our circumstances
by comparison with the less fortunate,
with certain of our peers, or with the
more fortunate. Compared to A things
might be going swimmingly, but com-
pared to B—or one’s hopes, aspirations,
expectations, past experience, etc.—one’s










In an award-winning paper, psychologist
Michael Hagerty demonstrates that partici-
pants in self-reported happiness surveys do
not all use the same internal standard for
reporting their life satisfaction. Some report
how well they are doing relative to their aspi-
rations, or how they just happen to be feeling
at the moment, but most report their life sat-
isfaction with an eye to how well they are
doing relative to their perceived peer group.
However, Hagerty shows that the standard of
judgment people use when reporting their
level of happiness is contextual and malleable,
and that we can easily switch our frame of ref-
erence when primed to do so. When asked to
report how well they are doing relative to their
own and their parents’ past, self-reported happi-
ness levels rose dramatically.38
Even more confounding, it is possible that
we do not always have ready or reliable access
to the quality of our own subjective states.
After summarizing the various forms of access
and reporting biases to which psychological
research has shown we are subject, Dan
Haybron concludes: “We cannot assume that
people are reliable judges of their own affective
states. In fact I suspect something stronger:
that pervasive [affective ignorance] is not just a
possibility, but the reality.”39 How is it possible
they cannot always accurately judge our own
inner lives? Psychological theorists Randy J.
Larsen and Barbara L. Fredrickson argue:
If some emotional episodes are either
outside phenomenal awareness or not
represented in working memory, par-
ticipants will be unable to perceive or
recognize the feeling state accurately
and, as a consequence, unable to pro-
vide accurate self-reports.40
A major problem in this regard is the
human capacity for habituation, mentioned
earlier as one of the three explanations for
the Easterlin Paradox. If you’ve ever jumped
into a swimming pool, cried out from the
shock of the cold, and then, just a few min-
utes later, found yourself splashing around
happily, no longer feeling cold at all, then
you’ve experienced habituation. If you buy a
new high-definition television, you’ll get an
initial boost in pleasure as you marvel at the
clarity of the picture, but after a while you’ll
simply forget what it was like not to see
Simon, Randy, and Paula’s pores. As former
American Psychological Association presi-
dent Martin Seligman writes: “This process
[of habituation] is an inviolable neurological
fact of life. Neurons are wired to respond to
novel events, and not to fire if the events do
not provide new information.”41 Although
greater income may purchase conveniences,
fancy cars, and neat gadgets, you simply get
used to them and eventually revert to your
ex-ante happiness “set point.” 
Hedonic or affective adaptation may be
natural selection’s way of allocating scarce
attention and motivation efficiently, reward-
ing the organism for deploying its resources
to new stimuli requiring immediate atten-
tion.42 Furthermore, the dissipation of both
good and bad feelings is likely to keep the
organism motivated. We’d starve if we never
again became hungry after eating one great
meal. And if the satisfaction of our last
achievement never faded, there might not be
a next achievement. The upshot is that there
is no “happiness bank” in which to accumu-
late and continually experience an ever
greater sum of good feelings. It seems to be a
condition of our biological emergence that
happiness is evanescent. Mark Twain nailed
it when one of his characters says, “as soon as
the novelty is over and the force of the con-
trast dulled, it ain’t happiness any longer,
and you have to get something fresh.”43
The phenomenon of adaptation cannot
only help explain why average levels of self-
reported happiness have tended not to rise,
but it can also explain how the trend in self-
reported happiness could remain flat even if
the quality of experience was improving (or
deteriorating). Adaptation may affect atten-
tion as well as feelings. Because the mind
seeks novelty and quickly shunts off anti-
quated stimuli into the background of
awareness, it is possible that we not only stop
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Audi looks, or how bad the paper mill smells,
but also that we stop noticing the quality of
our own experiential states once they, too,
have become old news. We stop paying atten-
tion especially if a change in feeling persists.
We might feel simply terrific and not notice,
since we almost always feel terrific. 
Besides the fact that most of us don’t pay
attention to how well we are doing compared
to how things were in the past, we aren’t usu-
ally mindful of just how well scientific and
economic progress has rooted out many small
and not-so-small aggravations and pains from
life. Prior to the advent of modern sanitation
and medicine, multitudes suffered from fre-
quent low-grade bacterial infections and wan-
dered around with toothaches and other
chronic maladies.44 It seems unlikely that peo-
ple simply adapted to it and didn’t really feel
lousy after a while. It seems rather more likely
that they felt lousy all along, but adapted atten-
tionally rather than experientially. They simply
stopped paying that much attention to the
constant dull pain, irritation, and fatigue,
because there was no new information in it. So
if you had asked how they were feeling, they
might have told you they felt fine, because
they weren’t paying attention by “design.”
Similar points can be made regarding all
the comforts and conveniences made avail-
able during the past half-century of flat self-
reported happiness levels. It is conceivable
that none of this has actually made a positive
difference in the quality of people’s subjective
experience, but it seems more likely that we
simply don’t realize just how good we feel.
This is one reason it is crucial for happiness
research to focus more on the biochemical
correlates of good and bad feelings in order
to create a more trustworthy picture of how
well we actually feel.
The usefulness of more objective, organic
measures is illustrated by a study reported by
Dan Haybron in his compelling, carefully
argued paper, “Do We Know How Happy We
Are?”:
[Subjects in a noisy office] showed ele-
vated epinephrine levels, made half as
many ergonomic adjustments to their
workstations, and were markedly less
persistent in efforts to solve difficult
puzzles afterwards. Yet the researchers
were surprised to find no differences in
reports of perceived stress—specifically,
reports about the extent to which sub-
jects felt “bothered, worried, relaxed,
frustrated, unhappy, contented, [or]
tense. . . . It seems likely that given
enough time, the experienced office
workers . . . ceased to notice the unpleas-
ant effects of the noise. Yet it also seems
plausible that the noise affected not
only subjects’ physiological responses
and behavior, but the hedonic quality of
their experience as well: they experi-
enced more stress, had a less pleasant
time of it, than they would have without
the noise.
If the contemporary developed world is like a
less-noisy office, we may in fact feel better
without knowing enough to say so.45
For all the ink spilled over the Easterlin
Paradox, it is puzzling how seldom happiness
researchers point out that while the scales on
happiness surveys are bounded, there is no
upper limit on the growth of income. This
should be an obvious source of possible dis-
tortion in the happiness data. Suppose for a
moment that happiness does rise continuously
with income, and suppose further that people
do not readjust their representations of the
happiness scale as they become wealthier. In
that case, there will be a point at which the
entire population has finally climbed into the
top happiness bracket. From that moment
forward, average happiness must remain flat,
simply as an artifact of the bounded scale, even
if people continue to become happier as they
continue to become richer. However, in light
of the fact that people have quite limited
access to the facts about how happy they are, it
seems almost certain that we have no idea how
happy it is possible to become—whether for
humans in general or as individuals. With no
knowledge of the real, empirical upper bound












the relationship of one’s feelings to the objec-
tive limit, it seems individuals have no alterna-
tive but to construct an internal representation
of the happiness scale on the basis of historical
and cultural convention (“Under what condi-
tions do people around here generally say they
are happy?”) and on the basis of some kind of
self or social comparison (“Everybody says
Barb is really happy, and I guess I’m doing a lit-
tle less well than Barb,” or “I feel a lot better
than I did last year.”) 
Even if happiness (as opposed to survey
measures thereof) has no fixed upper limit,
increasing individual levels of happiness may
come at an increasing individual cost. Such,
at any rate, is the suggestion made by Nobel
Prize-winning economist Gary Becker and
his coauthor Luis Rayo in a paper modeling
the evolutionary logic of adaptation.46 Becker
and Rayo are thinking of “evolutionary cost,”
in the context of inclusive biological fitness,
in order to demonstrate the possibility that
natural selection might lead to preferences
that limit the pursuit of happiness past a cer-
tain point. But it is possible to think of the
increasing marginal cost of happiness in
terms of personal cost if we accept that there
are values other than happiness, and there-
fore, do not assume that happiness is the
only “benefit” that may be of value to indi-
viduals. (Indeed, Becker and Rayo’s argument
sheds light on why evolution would lead us
to value things that are in competition with
happiness.) In that case, there may be a limit
to how much people they are willing to “pay”
to become happier. If someone has reached
the point at which a marginal “unit” of hap-
piness costs too much in terms of other val-
ues, then he will be optimally happy according
to his individual preferences. If the cost of
happiness, and willingness to pay for a mar-
ginal unit, varies from person to person, or
from society to society, an individual’s place
relative to his optimal upper limit may be dif-
ferent than his place on some imagined
objective scale. Therefore, one person may be
happier than another relative to some objec-
tive happiness scale, yet further away from
his own optimal upper bound. 
However, it is not even necessary to accept
the existence of values other than happiness to
reach this result, since happiness itself seems
to be multidimensional and plural in consti-
tution, having complex biological underpin-
nings. First, neuroscientific studies have estab-
lished that good and bad feelings do not exist
on a single continuum—an increment of plea-
sure does not cancel out an equal increment of
pain—and it is possible to feel happy and sad
simultaneously.47 Second, the fact that so
many different hormones and neurotransmit-
ters are causally implicated in different posi-
tive and negative feelings creates the possibili-
ty of what Dan Haybron calls an “affect-type
bias.” “When judging how happy we are, for
instance, we may focus primarily on affects
that fall along the joy-sadness dimension
rather than on those, say, along the anxious-
calm dimension,” Haybron writes.48
When there are so many things going on
at once biochemically and experientially, we
cannot pay attention to it all, and we may
find some types of good and bad feelings
more immediately available to awareness, or
more relevant for judgments about happi-
ness. Further, we may not know how much
weight to put on different dimensions of feel-
ing for the purposes of generating a single
summed judgment about our subjective well-
being. Imagine, for example, a man concur-
rently experiencing anxiety about missing an
appointment, satisfaction from a delicious
lunch, excitement at having won the office
fantasy football league, disappointment in
his daughter’s poor report card, and a shoot-
ing pain in his trick knee. If he’s going to
manage to make a judgment at all about how
well he’s feeling, he is going to need one
dimension of feeling to stand out especially
in attention (i.e., he may need an affect-type
bias), lest he get stuck in the quagmire of
determining just how much postprandial
delight weighs against paternal frustration.
If there is no single common currency of
affective experience, and feeling better on one
affective dimension sometimes come at the
expense of feeling better on another, then it is
inevitable that people will have highly vari-
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able and individualized exchange rates
between dimensions of affect. Optimal hap-
piness for one person, given her valuation of
different dimensions of affect, is going to
look very different from optimal happiness
for another. Notice that this is the case even
if we accept the dubious claim that only hap-
piness is of value. 
At this point, the very idea of objective
happiness scales seems to dissolve into a
morass of confusion. Can there be a determi-
nate way to locate the upper and lower
bounds of the happiness scale if, for example,
happiness is multidimensional, and the posi-
tions on the anxiety-calm dimension have no
set value relative to positions on the sadness-
joy dimension? Although we may be able use-
fully to measure individual dimensions of
happiness—whether it be calm, joy, sensual
pleasure, self-esteem, a sense of self-efficacy
and control, and so forth—we may not be
able to measure happiness as such because
Mother Nature has nowhere posted a table of
exchange rates between the various kinds of
feelings and mental states that are ingredi-
ents in individual conceptions of happiness.
Happiness—as a simple, universal, unitary
phenomenon—simply may not be out there
in the world for the scientist to find. 
What Are We Trying to Measure?
Julia Annas, an eminent historian of
ancient philosophy and author of The Morality
of Happiness—a scholarly book exploring
ancient Greek conceptions of happiness—dis-
covered one day that she had been added to a
bibliography of happiness researchers on the
World Database of Happiness website.
Browsing around the site, she was discour-
aged to find nothing that resembled the con-
ception of “happiness as achievement” she
had developed from decades of studying
Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. However dis-
couraged, in the end Annas was not surprised
“that if you rush to look for empirical mea-
sures of an unanalyzed ‘subjective’ phenome-
non, the result will be confusion and banality.
After all,” she continues, “what is it that the
social scientists on the World Database of
Happiness are actually measuring? Here is the
heart of the problem. Is happiness really
something subjective? Is it simply a matter of
pleasure, a positive feeling? One can at least
hope it is not.”49
The panoply of measurement techniques
and the multiplicity of dimensions of good
and bad feeling force us to follow Annas and
ask pointedly what it is exactly that research-
ers are attempting to measure. To say we are
trying to size up “happiness” is to say some-
thing, but, unfortunately, not very much.
Because, well, what is happiness? 
While surveying the happiness literature, it
is easy to get the impression that somebody—
maybe even everybody—knows the answer. But
if questions have sizes, then this is something
like the Everest of questions. Its unavoidable
shadow falls over the entire enterprise of hap-
piness research, and accounts of successful
expeditions give conflicting descriptions of
the view from the summit. So far I have acqui-
esced in the indiscriminate use of the term
“happiness,” but the various measurement
techniques track different, if overlapping,
phenomena. Furthermore, it is unclear that
any of these techniques measure whatever it is
that we are thinking about when we think
about how much we would like to be happy. 
In technical language, the question
amounts to this: what is the dependent vari-
able—the target of elucidation and explana-
tion—in happiness research? Here are the main
possibilities:
(1) Life satisfaction
A cognitive judgment about overall life
quality relative to expectations. 
(2) Experiential or “hedonic” quality
The quantity of pleasure net of pain in the
stream of subjective experience.
(3) Happiness 
Some state yet to be determined, but con-
ceived as a something not exhausted by
life satisfaction or the quality of experien-
tial states.
(4) Well-being or welfare
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The relationship between these four con-
ceptions in the happiness literature is exceed-
ingly complex. And the views of prominent
happiness scholars fail spectacularly to con-
verge on a single conception of happiness
that could be used as a standard for the eval-
uation of institutions and public policy. The
extent of disagreement about the constitu-
tion and measurement of happiness is best
grasped by looking at the views of a few
prominent happiness scholars.
Let’s start with Richard Layard, who in his
book Happiness blithely merges all four
notions into one (or jumps from one to anoth-
er with abandon), assuming that well-being is
no more or less than happiness, that happi-
ness is no more or less than a flow of pleasant
experience, and that life satisfaction surveys
reliably indicate the average hedonic quality of
the stream of subjective states.50 Layard
proudly declares himself an unreconstructed
disciple of British utilitarian philosopher
Jeremy Bentham, who held that happiness or
“utility” is no more or less than pleasurable
experience, and that his Principle of Greatest
Happiness—that the right action or rule is
always the one that will maximize happiness
so construed—is the one and only evaluative
standard for both individual and political
decisionmaking. “I believe that Bentham’s
idea was correct,” Layard confesses, “and that
we should fearlessly adopt it and apply it to
our lives.”51
Nobel Prize-winning Princeton psycholo-
gist Daniel Kahneman—a good bet as the
most influential living experimental cogni-
tive psychologist—also takes a page from
Bentham and conceives of happiness in line
with idea (2), the quality of experience on a
pleasure/pain or good/bad continuum.52
However, unlike Layard, Kahneman forceful-
ly denies that idea (1), judgments of life satis-
faction, reliably track the hedonic quality of
experience over time. 
In a famous 1996 study on the ability of
patients to recall the painfulness of an unpleas-
ant medical procedure (a colonoscopy), Kahne-
man, together with medical researcher Donald
Redelmeier, demonstrated that patient self-
reports after the fact systematically fail to reflect
the actual average intensity of pain they had
reported on a pain scale every 60 seconds during
the procedure.53 “The retrospective evaluations
of patients are suspect because they are liable to
biases of memory and to a process of evaluation
that sometimes violates elementary logical
rules,” Kahneman writes.54 He is therefore
motivated to distinguish between the “remem-
bered utility,” the retrospective evaluation of an
episode, and the “total utility,” the aggregation
of “moment utilities” over a period of time.
According to Kahneman, “subjective happi-
ness” is (unreliably) “remembered utility,” and
“objective happiness” is the “total utility” over
your life so far. “The implication of this analy-
sis,” Kahneman argues, “is that the goal of pol-
icy should be to increase measures of objective
well-being, not measures of satisfaction or sub-
jective happiness.”55 Kahneman has therefore
developed the experience sampling and day-
reconstruction self-report methods in order to
minimize the distortions of broad-brush self-
report measures like happiness surveys.
So Richard Layard and Daniel Kahneman,
perhaps the two most eminent proponents
of a classically utilitarian, hedonistic concep-
tion of happiness, disagree fundamentally
about the measurement techniques that best
provide information about happiness as they
understand it. According to Layard, “It is the
long-term average happiness of each individ-
ual that this book is about, rather than the
fluctuations from moment to moment,” yet
his policy proposals lean heavily on precisely
the kind of life satisfaction survey data that
Kahneman has proven to fail in extracting an
accurate average from the hedonic flow.56
Is the unadorned hedonistic notion of
happiness and well-being advanced by
Layard and Kahneman as the basis of a “sci-
ence” of happiness and well-being actually
true? That’s not a scientific question. It’s a
philosophical question about the nature of
moral value, and philosophical questions
about moral value aren’t what economists
and psychologists are trained to answer. 
Is happiness really nothing more than a
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over one’s lifetime? As philosopher Robert
Nozick noted, a miserable life with a moment
of transcendent bliss at the very last moment
may have higher average hedonic utility than
a normal life with normal satisfactions, but
few of us would choose the former.57
Similarly, a life that starts out at a peak of
immense happiness but slowly erodes so that
each moment is slightly less pleasant than
the last may contain a greater average of
hedonic utility than a normal life, but, again,
only a masochist would want it. It is plausible
that many or most of us value the distribution
of pleasure over the course of life: we may
value a life that feels good generally and gets
better over time more than, say, a hugely
volatile life of towering peaks of pleasure and
deep pits of despair, even if the latter is more
pleasurable on average. Which is just another
way of saying we don’t necessarily value
episodes with more total pleasure over
episodes with less. 
We also have Nozick to thank for the
famous thought experiment of the “experi-
ence machine,” a device in which we live out
the rest of our lives in something like a coma,
but with the vivid experience of the most
pleasurable life we can possibly imagine.58
Nozick argues that the fact so many of us
would choose a less pleasurable life with real
engagement, real accomplishment, and real
failure over an ideally blissful life of illusion
plugged into the machine—even were we com-
pletely confident that it would work exactly as
advertised—shows that pleasure cannot be
the only thing we value.
“Time and philosophical fashion have not
been kind to hedonism,” notes University of
Toronto philosopher Wayne Sumner, the
author of an influential treatise on well-
being. “Although hedonistic theories of vari-
ous sorts flourished for three centuries or so
in the congenial empiricist habitat, they have
all but disappeared from the scene. Do they
now merit even passing attention, for other
than nostalgic reasons?”59 University of
Alabama economist and philosopher of sci-
ence Erik Angner observes that the hedonis-
tic conception of happiness and well-being is
“now considered so implausible that there is
not a single living philosopher (to the best of
my knowledge) who is willing to defend it.”60
It’s not only moral philosophers who dis-
agree with Layard and Kahneman (who dis-
agree with each other about what would
count as evidence that someone is happy).
Other happiness researchers disagree with
them, too, and with each other. 
Julia Annas may be heartened to know
that a number of happiness researchers do
integrate Aristotelian, or eudaimonistic,
ideas of happiness as objective flourishing
into their studies. Martin Seligman, the
doyen of the “positive psychology” move-
ment, argues that the “measurable compo-
nents of what people mean by happiness”
include pleasure, eudaimonia (which he
characterizes as “engaged well-function”),
and a sense of meaning in life.61 In Happiness:
The Science Behind Your Smile, University of
Newcastle psychologist Daniel Nettle con-
ceives of “happiness” as a multivalent term
encompassing three distinct “levels.” For
Nettle, “Level One” happiness consists of
“momentary pleasures.” “Level Two” happi-
ness consists of “judgments about feelings,”
the same idea captured by “life satisfaction.”
Level Three” happiness is taken to concern
“quality of life,” which Nettle sees as eudai-
monistic “flourishing” or “fulfilling one’s
potential”—a more objective notion of well-
being.62 Carol Ryff identifies two traditions
in well-being research, one focused on “hedo-
nic well-being”—the SWB that dominates
happiness research—and one focused on
“eudaimonic well-being,” which she charac-
terizes as “perceived thriving vis-à-vis the exis-
tential challenges of life” and labels “psycho-
logical well-being” or PWB.63
Seligman, Nettle, and Ryff’s complex con-
ceptions of happiness and well-being are sim-
ilar, attempting to frame a notion of happi-
ness richer than simple pleasure, but they
also differ in important respects. In any case,
it is apparent that most current techniques
for measuring happiness—such as life satis-
faction survey questions or experience sam-









least profound part) of the larger idea of hap-
piness or well-being each has in mind. While
complex conceptions of well-being are more
nuanced—and for that reason alone more
plausible as accounts of a good human life—
than Layard or Kahneman’s hedonism, their
complexity also creates daunting problems
of measurement. And even if any of them are
measurable, their complexity threatens to
make them unfit as standards for the evalua-
tion of public policy. 
A study by Ryff and her coauthors com-
paring measures of hedonic SWB with eudai-
monic PWB helps illustrate why. Ryff and her
team found that although SWB and PWB are
generally strongly correlated, they come
apart for some people due to factors of indi-
vidual personality. “We found,” they wrote,
“that those with high levels of psychological
thriving (i.e., PWB) but low levels of happi-
ness (i.e., SWB) were distinguished from their
opposite counterpart (high SWB/low PWB)
by their levels of Openness to Experience.”64
The point here is that if there is more than
one dimension to happiness or well-being,
then there may be trade-offs between them, at
least for some people. If life satisfaction and
positive affect aren’t all there is to happiness
or well-being, then the attempt to maximize
them may come at the expense of something
else of value, such as a sense of challenged
thriving. And in that case, even a benevolent
dictator endowed with perfect knowledge
would be unable to maximize all dimensions
at once. The dictator would have to make a
value judgment about which dimension of
happiness is most important. But even then:
most important to whom?
As I suggested in the previous section, the
complex biochemistry of good and bad feel-
ings suggests that there are many more than
two dimensions even to hedonic well-being,
and so trade-offs among them are inevitable.
The noise, bustle, and danger of a big city are
no doubt a source of higher levels of cortisol
and thus stress. Which is one important rea-
son some people would rather live in the coun-
try. But cities can also be a greater source of
stimulating novelty—more short bursts of
dopamine—which is one important reason
people choose to live in cities. So is it better, in
terms of good and bad feelings, to live in the
country or the city? It depends on how much
you value peace vs. stress, familiarity vs. novel-
ty. If there is no external standard for deter-
mining the value of different dimensions of
affect, then there is no universally right
answer. Better for whom? 
Whether it is better, in terms of feelings, to
live in the city or the country may be no differ-
ent than the question of whether it is better, in
terms of feelings, to live in Sweden or the
United States. Some Americans may feel better
in Sweden, and, judging from Minnesota, many
Swedes may feel right at home in America.
Philosopher Nicolas White argues that
people don’t want to be happy as much as to
achieve their aims, whatever they may be. The
concept of happiness surely involves some
level of positive experience, but by and large it
is a blank that we fill in by the achievement of
our plans, projects, and goals. As we change
our goals, balance conflicting desires, and
amend and specify the details of our plans,
our conceptions of happiness changes:
As we develop a picture of what life is to
be like, we don’t start from a “frame-
work” concept of happiness (an idea of
what the picture on the puzzle is to be),
to which we tailor our particular aims
so that they’ll fit into it. . . . For the most
part, we build up a conception of what
happiness would be out of the aims that
we have. But we never have or try for a
completely and consistently articulated con-
cept of happiness, or even suppose that
there must be such a thing. . . . If that’s
right, then in an important sense the
history of the concept of happiness has
been a search for something that’s
unobtainable.65
And if that’s right, happiness is not mea-
surable, since there is no one thing indepen-
dent of individual aims “out there” to mea-
sure. This is not to say that the various dimen-














measurable. Nor is this to say that a sense of
challenged thriving, a sense of meaning, or the
sense that life is satisfying is beyond the reach
of measurement and analysis. The point is
simply that different people with different
aims may prioritize each of these things quite
differently and yet be equally concerned with
their “happiness.” There is no order of such
priorities that represents happiness par excel-
lence, and an evaluative standard biased
toward any one of them isn’t a standard com-
mitted to happiness per se. 
Moreover, there are plausibly nonsubjective
aspects of well-being, such as health, longevi-
ty, real opportunity, the development of basic
human capacities, and the achievement of
values other than happiness. Not only do
people give different weights to the various
elements of happiness and well-being, people
don’t even agree about what they are. What’s
more, many people don’t even agree that
happiness or well-being, however conceived, is
the greatest good. The fact of disagreement
over the nature of happiness, or the nature of
the good more generally, does not establish
that there is no right answer to these ques-
tions. The presence of disagreement among
reasonable people is simply an empirical
fact—what philosopher John Rawls calls “the
fact of pluralism”—that places a hard con-
straint on both the practical success and
moral legitimacy of policies derived from any
evaluative standard.66
Polities can manage the fact of pluralism by
looking to general values common across oth-
erwise conflicting worldviews. “People can
agree, for example, on the importance of hav-
ing opportunities for self-expression (the exact
form of these opportunities being as yet
unspecified) even though they disagree sharply
over the merits of particular speeches, plays,
demonstrations, etc.,” notes Harvard political
philosopher T. M. Scanlon. “Similarly, people
who hold very different and conflicting beliefs
may still be able to agree that ‘being able to fol-
low one’s religion’ is (for those who have one)
an important part of life, and consequently a
personal value that must be given significant
weight in moral argument.”67
Likewise, almost no one denies that hap-
piness is important (not in Western societies
at least), even if some deny that it is most
important. And whatever different people
think about how happiness is constituted,
most of us would like more pleasure, more
“flow,” a greater sense of meaning, and a
greater sense of self-efficacy in the face of
life’s challenges. If a psychologist ambles up
to you with a clipboard, and asks how happy
you are with life as a whole, then, if you’re like
me, you would like to be able to sincerely say:
“very happy.” 
Despite the foregoing criticisms, happi-
ness research as it stands is far from useless.
We can make the best use of it if we don’t
naively assume that happiness is really the pri-
mary subject of measurement and research,
as if the elusive nature of happiness has been
pinned down at long last. Happiness research
does tell us something about how we feel,
and it tells us a lot about the conditions
under which different kinds of people are
inclined to say that they are satisfied or
unsatisfied with life. Good feelings are
important, and so are culture-laden judg-
ments that life is going well, even if happiness
is more and less than that. It would be pretty
incredible if the disposition to say that we are
happy on a survey didn’t correlate well with
certain good feelings and other good things.
And the evidence is clear that it does. 
I have done my best to expose the weak-
nesses of the dominant survey methods in
order to provide a much-needed counter-
weight to the often complacent confidence in
their reliability and lack of care in the inter-
pretation of their results. When intellectuals
and politicians use putatively scientific data
for political purposes, it is important to apply
careful scrutiny to their methods and to the
way their results are interpreted and used. If,
however, we are very careful when comparing
happiness survey results across different cul-
tures or across long periods of time; or when
looking at studies that make no note of indi-
vidual personality differences, that do not fol-
low the same individuals over time, or that









is possible to glean solid information about
things almost all of us care about that ought
to have real weight—if not all the weight—in
our public deliberation about our political
and economic institutions and policies. In
that regard, it is heartening that recent studies
deploy more sophisticated research designs,
better econometric techniques, better theoret-
ical constructs, larger data sets, and integra-
tion with more objective and rigorous biologi-
cal measurement techniques. 
So let’s return to our main question: do
these studies show that the political and eco-
nomic institutions of the United States are fail-
ing its citizens in their pursuit of happiness?
Is There Something Wrong
with the United States?
Happiness research presently falls short as
good science and fails to get off the ground
as an adequate ethical standard for evaluat-
ing public policy. These conclusions admit-
tedly follow from a fairly complex train of
reasoning starting from a number of con-
testable assumptions that are impossible to
vindicate fully in such a short space. Maybe
you’re not entirely convinced. That’s okay.
Even if you don’t buy the foregoing analy-
sis of the complex methodological and philo-
sophical problems that dog happiness
research; even if you remain convinced that
recent survey-based scholarship really does
give us highly reliable and useful information
on the determinants of happiness and well-
being; even if you think happiness so con-
ceived really is the primary target at which
policymakers ought to aim, it remains possi-
ble to accept survey-based happiness research
at face value and show that the U.S.-style
socioeconomic model is not only a recipe for
immense riches, which no one disputes, but a
winning recipe for happiness.  
A casual glance at the comparative interna-
tional happiness data is enough to make us
wary of the claim that there is some special
problem with the United States relative to other
nations in terms of happiness. Consider, for
example, Figure 1, which presents psychologist
Adrian White’s “Map of World Happiness”
based on the World Database of Happiness
international rankings. 
The United States is evidently among the
world’s happiest nations, on par with Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, and a few surprises, like
El Salvador and Nigeria. Notably, the largest
European social democracies, Germany and
France, fall one or two ranks below the United
States.
In various rankings using different sur-
veys, the United States consistently ranks
from the mid-teens to the mid-twenties out of
more than 200 countries—in or around the
90th percentile—in terms of average self-
reported happiness. A 2005 Harris poll using
the Eurobarometer questions found the
United States to be happier than every
European country, other than Denmark. Or
consider Table 1, which lists the top 50 coun-
tries in self-reported happiness according to
the World Values Survey. The United States
ranks higher than Sweden, Norway, Belgium,
Finland, Germany, and France. So much for
Benjamin Radcliff’s claim that “life satisfac-
tion should increase as we move from less to
more social democratic welfare states.”68 If we
take the data at face value, the obvious con-
clusion is that the United States is among the
happiest places in the world. 
As noted in my introduction, psychologist
Geoffrey Miller believes that “the utilitarian
argument for the rich giving more of their
money to the poor is now scientifically
irrefutable.”69 Would Americans be happier
with a larger and more generous welfare
state? If the argument for downward redistri-
bution is “irrefutable,” then the evidence for
it ought to shine forth in the data. According
to Dutch sociologist Ruut Veenhoven, chief
of the World Database of Happiness and
founder and editor of the Journal of Happiness
Studies, there is barely a flicker of a finding for
a welfare-happiness connection:
Contrary to expectation there appears
to be no link between the size of the
17
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welfare state and the level of wellbeing
within it. In countries with generous
social security schemes people are not
healthier or happier than in equally
affluent countries where the state is
less open-handed. Increases or reduc-
tions in social security expenditure are
not related to a rise or fall in the level of
health and happiness either.70
Another Dutch happiness researcher, Piet
Ouweneel of Erasmus University, Netherlands,
conjectured that at least the unemployed would
have higher average well-being, according to a
number of indicators, in nations that spent a
larger percentage of GDP on welfare. But
greater welfare spending had no statistically sig-
nificant effect—even on the happiness of the unem-
ployed. While larger welfare states generally do
achieve lower levels of income inequality
through redistribution. “This apparent income
redistribution does not have any significant
effect on the subjective well-being of the unem-
ployed. The general picture is that they are nei-
ther happier nor healthier in welfare states.”71
Ouweneel concludes that “in first world
nations there is no consistent pattern of social
security levels having a positive effect on well-
being indicators.”72
By contrast, Notre Dame political scientist
Benjamin Radcliff does finds a small statisti-
cally significant positive effect of generous wel-
fare spending on average happiness, and Har-
vard economist Rafael Di Tella finds a small
boost from generous unemployment benefits.
Ouweneel, however, criticizes both studies for
comparing a very small set of countries.
Further, he notes both were able to achieve sta-
tistical significance only by treating successive
years in these countries as independent data
points—a methodological faux pas.73










A Global Projection of Subjective Well-Being
Source: Adrian G. White, “A Global Projection of Subjective Well-being: A Challenge to Positive Psychology?”
Department of Psychology, University of Leicester, http://www.le.ac.uk/pc/aw57/world/sample.html.
from the existing happiness literature is that
if the redistributive openhandedness of the
state has any effect on happiness at all, it is a
surpassingly small one. When slightly differ-
ent econometric techniques using slightly
different datasets generate weak correlations
in opposite directions, the correct lesson to
draw is that the variable barely matters at all.
If Americans are less happy on average than
citizens of some other nations—and we are
happier than all but a handful—the scope
and generosity of the welfare state has little
or nothing to do with it. 
If relatively lavish welfare spending fails to
increase happiness, other forms of govern-
ment spending might nevertheless succeed.
One reason big government could have a pos-
itive effect on happiness, aside from progres-
sive redistribution, is that a higher rate of gov-
ernment spending as a percentage of GDP
might indicate better provision of the kinds of
public goods that unaided market institutions
are often thought to be incapable of provid-
ing.74 But economists Christian Bjornskov,
Axel Dreher, and Justina Fischer find that “life
satisfaction decreases with higher government
spending.”75 Intriguingly, they also find that
the “negative impact of the government is
stronger in countries with a leftwing median
voter”—which is to say, in places where voters
most want big government. 
Advocates of progressive taxation and
income redistribution through welfare trans-













Subjective Well-Being Rankings of 50 Countries
1. Puerto Rico 4.67 26. France 2.61
2. Mexico 4.32 27. Argentina 2.61
3. Denmark 4.24 28. Vietnam 2.59
4. Ireland 4.16 29. Chile 2.53
5. Iceland 4.15 30. Taiwan 2.25
6. Switzerland 4.00 31. Domin.Rep. 2.25
7. N. Ireland 3.97 32. Brazil 2.23
8. Netherlands 3.86 33. Spain 2.13
9. Canada 3.76 34. Israel 2.08
10. Austria 3.69 35. Italy 2.06
11. El Salvador 3.67 36. E. Germany 2.02
12. Venezuela 3.58 37. Slovenia 2.02
13. Luxembourg 3.52 38. Uruguay 2.02
14. United States 3.47 39. Portugal 1.99
15. Australia 3.46 40. Japan 1.96
16. New Zealand 3.39 41. Czech Rep 1.94
17. Sweden 3.36 42. South Africa 1.86
18. Nigeria 3.32 43. Croatia 1.55
19. Norway 3.25 44. Greece 1.45
20. Belgium 3.23 45. Peru 1.32
21. Finland 3.23 46. China 1.20
22. Saudi Arabia 3.01 47. South Korea 1.12
23. Singapore 3.00 48. Iran 0.93
24. Britain 2.92 49. Poland 0.84
25. W. Germany 2.67 49. Turkey 0.84
Source: Based on Ronald Inglehart, “Subjective Well-Being Rankings of 82 Societies,” World Values Survey.
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/Upload/5_wellbeingrankings.doc Latin American countries, which score high-
er than predicted given the quality of their economic and political institutions, are in italics. The wealthy OECD
countries are in bold. Ex-communist countries are underlined. East and West Germany are scored separately to
reflect the effects of their different institutional histories.
policies not only in terms of the increased
well-being of the least well-off, but in terms
of the overall importance of reducing income
inequality generally. In theory, high relative
income and social status are important to
happiness, and we are therefore aggravated
by the conspicuous display of goods we can-
not afford. If true, it would make sense for a
leveling of incomes to have some positive
effect on happiness. But, again, empirical evi-
dence is hard to come by.
Alberto Alesina, Rafael Di Tella, and Robert
MacCulloch have found that inequality in the
United States has no effect on the self-reported
happiness of the poor. “Probably the most
striking result of all is the complete lack of any
effect of inequality on the happiness of the
American poor and the American left,” they
report. There is a very small statistically signif-
icantly negative effect in the United States, but
it is driven almost entirely by the effect of
inequality on the rich. This is so striking in part
because it is basically the reverse of the situa-
tion in Europe, where there is a much larger
negative effect of inequality, due mostly to the
dislike of inequality by the poor and left-wing
voters.76
This contrast between Europe and the
United States raises a crucial point about the
interpretation of the effect of macroeconomic
variables on happiness—namely, their effect is
culturally and ideologically mediated. The
authors argue that the different effects of
inequality in Europe and the United States are
due largely to different prevailing attitudes
about income mobility. Whether or not their
beliefs are realistic, Americans—even the poor
and the left-wingers—have a strong faith in the
possibility of upward mobility, at least com-
pared to Europeans. Under those conditions,
the fabulously rich demonstrate to other
Americans just how astronomically high it is
possible to rise and stand out as figures of
admiration and emulation. (This is perhaps
why rich-bashing populism is a perpetual elec-
toral failure in U.S. politics.) The American
rich also believe strongly in mobility, but
where there are wide income disparities, they
see all too clearly how far they could fall. Of
course, it is possible to criticize Americans for
having unrealistic beliefs about mobility, for
they are generally unrealistic, especially among
the poor. But if inequality has no negative
effect on happiness independent of attitudes
toward mobility, it seems that a happiness-
promoting policymaker would want to
encourage, not discourage, the American con-
viction in mobility. 
By most measures, income inequality has
been rising in the United States. However,
inequality in happiness has declined. Rising
income inequality, then, does not imply a
widening gap in satisfaction with life. On the
contrary, Americans are becoming more equal
in happiness even as the income gap widens.
Sociologist Jan Ott finds that rising average
levels of happiness go together with decreas-
ing levels of happiness inequality because the
“level and equality of happiness depend even-
tually on the same institutional conditions.”
And the institutions of wealth creation are
among the most important: “Wealth con-
tributes to higher levels of happiness and cre-
ates ample possibilities to reduce inequality in
happiness,” Ott writes.77
The creation of wealth depends on a com-
plex system of underlying economic, legal, and
cultural institutions. Other things equal,
nations that ensure their citizens’ greater eco-
nomic freedom are also wealthier. The United
States is the most visible embodiment of the
ideals of economic freedom on the world
stage. However, emphasis on the importance
of distinctively economic freedom in the happi-
ness literature is relatively new, which is per-
haps one reason the ideals of relatively
unhampered markets and open exchange—
ideals strongly associated with the United
States on the world stage—have yet to get ade-
quate emphasis in popular accounts of happi-
ness research. 
Ott finds that economic freedom as mea-
sured by both the Heritage Foundation and
the Fraser Institute correlates strongly with
high and highly equal levels of happiness—as
strongly as almost any variable.78 Veenhoven
finds that economic freedom correlates more













variable other than wealth (as measured by
purchasing power per capita) and degree of
social tolerance (i.e., acceptance of plural-
ism).79 And in the largest study on economic
freedom and happiness yet conducted, econo-
mists Tomi Ovaska and Ryo Takashima find
that economic freedom is the variable most
highly correlated with self-reported happiness
(see Figure 2). According to Ovaska and
Takashima:
Compared to the GDP per capita mea-
sure, the index of economic freedom—
personal choice, freedom to compete
and the security of privately owned
property as its core components—
turned out to be about four times as
important, as measured by elasticities.
This indicates that the newly found
interest of economics and of policymak-
ers in measures of institutional quality
is well placed. Based on the regression
results, economic freedom holds some
promise in serving as one of the policy
tools that could be potentially used to
increase the SWB of a nation’s popula-
tion.80
According to Ovaska and Takashima, “The
results suggest that people unmistakably
care about the degree to which the society
where they live provides them opportunities
and the freedom to undertake new projects,
and make choices based on one’s personal
preferences.”81
According to the Heritage Foundation’s
2007 Index of Economic Freedom, the United
States ranked fourth, behind Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Australia. And according to
the Fraser Institute-Cato Institute 2006
Economic Freedom of the World Report, the












Self-Reported Happiness and Economic Freedom
Source: Tomi Ovaska and Ryo Takashima, “Economic Policy and the Level of Self-Perceived Well-Being: An
International Comparison,” Journal of Socio-Economics 35 (2006): 314.
with Australia and Switzerland, behind Hong
Kong and Singapore. The evidence is extreme-
ly strong that the outstanding level of eco-
nomic freedom in the United States has a
strong effect on its high showing in the inter-
national happiness comparisons. Any policy
package aiming to improve American happi-
ness should have initiatives to improve eco-
nomic freedom at the forefront.
A fair look at a number of the most recent,
and most sophisticated, happiness studies
suggests that the United States, far from being
a problem country, exemplifies many of the
institutional virtues that strongly predict high
levels of national self-reported happiness.
Although the United States is routinely criti-
cized by Europeans and its own political left
for a stingy welfare state and high levels of
income inequality, there is almost no evidence in
the happiness literature to support the idea
that Americans would be better off with either
lower levels of income inequality or a policy of
more generous welfare transfers. The high lev-
els of economic growth and economic free-
dom in the United States are effectively
increasing the average American level of hap-
piness while decreasing inequality in life satis-
faction between its citizens. 
If we take the current international com-
parisons at face value, one very clear picture
emerges: advanced, liberal-democratic market
economies are the happiest places on Earth.
However, if we descend from such rarefied
heights of generality, the picture goes blurry.
The data are too coarse to distinguish among
packages of specific policies—to tell us, for
example, that we would be happier with
mandatory paid maternity leave, or with
greater restrictions on the content of advertis-
ing to children. As with inequality, we will
often find that the effect of policy on happi-
ness is mediated by culturally specific beliefs
and attitudes. So, beyond a general recom-
mendation to increase economic freedom and
eliminate policies that hinder economic
growth (which I will discuss in detail below),
there is almost no specific guidance here for a
policymaker. The picture that does emerge
from the data is most emphatically not a pic-
ture of American misery, nor does it even hint
at a problem with America’s conduciveness to
happiness relative to the European social
democracies. 
Taxing Ambition
As noted at the outset, some of the most
compelling happiness-based arguments for
income redistribution are built on the alleged
importance of relative as opposed to absolute
income and wealth. However, these arguments
are much more theory-driven than data-dri-
ven, turning on a very particular hypothesis
about the role and importance of social status
in human life. We have already seen that the
empirical happiness-based case for reducing
inequality and increasing welfare spending is
extraordinarily weak. It should not be surpris-
ing, then, that a hypothesis about human
nature that leads to poor predictions about
inequality and redistribution should also be
ill-supported by the facts. However, because
the relative position hypothesis is so com-
pelling to some very fine minds, it is impor-
tant to understand in detail why it fails and
why the importance of relative position pro-
vides no credible happiness-based case for
more redistribution.82
The politics of relative position encourages
us to see life as a competitive climb up a ladder
of status. If there can be only one person per
rung on any dimension of status or rank, then
each step up the ladder for one person logical-
ly requires a step down for another. You can’t
make space for an eleventh restaurant or uni-
versity on a “Top Ten” list, just as two runners
can’t both come in first. Competition for
higher position is a paradigmatic zero-sum
game—every move up is offset by a corre-
sponding move down. So if inherently scarce
positional goods like ladder rank are highly
valued, then whenever you get a raise, a pro-
motion, or a swank new suit, you must create
a shower of negative psychic consequences
that rain on those occupying the rungs below. 
According to Layard, Frank and others, we
fiercely value inherently scarce positional
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goods because we fiercely value status—the
ultimate positional good. This explains, they
posit, why average self-reported happiness has
not gone up over time, though wealthier peo-
ple at any time are more likely to be happier.
Higher relative standing makes us happier, but
the middle of the income distribution is the
middle, no matter how big the number. So
there is no avoiding the positional downside of
every positional upside. But, they insist, we can-
not simply shrug off the inevitable cruelty of a
world in which our interests are in irreconcil-
able conflict. Policy must take human nature
seriously and do what it can to help. We should
take the dismay and anxiety caused by zero-
sum competition over positional goods just as
seriously as sludge dumped in a stream, the
roar of jets at a nearby airport, or other classic
examples of negative spillover effects (or “nega-
tive externalities”) of economic activity. 
In addition to the “harms” caused by any
upward positional move, Frank and Layard
worry about the negative effects of positional
“arms races.” If I try hard to move up the
positional ladder, the people just ahead will
try harder still to maintain their lead. In the
end, we’re all likely to wind up about where
we started in terms of relative position, but
we’ll all be exhausted by the race. As an illus-
tration, Frank highlights the signaling func-
tion of fashion:
If some job candidates begin wearing
expensive custom-tailored suits, a side
effect of their action is that other candi-
dates become less likely to make favor-
able impressions on interviewers. From
any individual job seeker’s point of view,
the best response might be to match the
higher expenditures of others, lest her
chances of landing the job fall. But this
outcome may be inefficient, since when
all spend more, each candidate’s proba-
bility of success remains unchanged. All
may agree that some form of collective
restraint on expenditure would be use-
ful.83
Frank argues that it is often impractical or
impossible for individuals to negotiate a
truce, so a trusted third party—the state—
must step in and impose a price cap or a tax
on fancy suits (or cars, houses, or whatever)
in order to mitigate the “harm” caused by
self-defeating attempts to get ahead. 
The intractability of zero-sum positional
competition for Frank and Layard flows from
a rather nasty conception of human nature,
according to which we are dominated by a uni-
versal, inflexible, deep-seated, status-seeking
instinct, together with a remarkably narrow,
materialistic conception of how positional
competition is culturally mediated. Theirs is a
distressingly agonistic vision of the human
predicament in which life is irremediably
brutish and nasty, if not short. “The desire for
status is utterly natural,” Layard writes. “But it
creates a massive problem if we want to make
people happier, for the total amount of status
is fixed . . . If my score improves, someone else’s
deteriorates.”84
In our original evolutionary context, Frank
argues, higher-rank individuals would have
had greater access to material resources and
the highest quality mates, increasing the pro-
portion of their genes in future populations.
Therefore, Frank concludes, “it would be
strange indeed if the relentless forces of natur-
al selection had not honed a human brain that
strongly motivated its bearer to seek high
rank.”85 Mother Nature has doomed us, like
other primates, to act as status-seeking mis-
siles. 
Layard recognizes this line of thought may
sound ugly to certain ears. Accordingly, he
imagines a critical “libertarian” who objects
that public policy based on our status-fixation
affirms and rewards an “ignoble sentiment
[like envy] that ought to be disregarded.” He
responds: 
This is an extraordinarily weak argu-
ment. Public policy has to deal with
human nature as it is. The desire for sta-
tus is after all ubiquitous, and we all rec-
ognize it. Greed is also common, and
libertarians do not disallow it. Both sen-











We are not perfect, and public policy
should help us make the best of what we
are.86
Layard is concerned to get us to take the
inescapability of status-racing seriously, or
else his argument for taxes on positional
“pollution” will fall apart. He’s right that we
must deliberate about policy “taking men as
they are and laws as they might be,” as
Rousseau put it.87 And we should not be sur-
prised to find that our theory of human
nature will largely determine which laws and
institutions seem feasible and desirable.
However, although Frank and Layard’s forays
into speculative evolutionary psychology
may be better than “extraordinarily weak,”
they don’t amount to a state-of-the art con-
ception of human nature “as it is,” either.
Taking people as they really are is the down-
fall of the politics of relative position. 
It is true that status is no ideological
fancy; it has a real organic basis. Frank and
Layard both refer to studies involving vervet
monkeys showing that serotonin and testos-
terone concentrations correlate positively
with position in the deference-dominance
hierarchy.88 Similarly, in an article in the New
Yorker on the importance of relative (as
opposed to absolute) poverty, writer John
Cassidy notes that low-ranking baboons have
elevated levels of stress hormones, and that
low-ranking rhesus monkeys face elevated
risk of arteriosclerosis.89 There is some good
evidence of similar physical correlates of sta-
tus in humans. “If monkeys enjoy status, so
do human beings,” Layard reasons.90 He then
rushes to explore the policy implications of
intractable status competition.
But the fact that we are not actually vervet
monkeys or baboons matters a great deal.
Species differences matter a lot, even between
monkeys and chimps. Pioneering primatolo-
gist and psychologist Abraham Maslow first
pointed out the vast difference in behavior
between often friendly and tolerant domi-
nant chimpanzees and vigilantly despotic
dominant rhesus monkeys.91 “Real and pro-
found differences are glossed over by flat
statements that all primates know domi-
nance-subordination relationships,” writes
Frans de Waal, the world’s leading expert on
primate hierarchies.92
Real and profound differences are also
glossed over by failing to acknowledge what is
peculiar to humans. For one thing, we are
uniquely cultural creatures, and this funda-
mentally transforms the zero-sum logic of the
primate dominance hierarchy. We have
already seen how the effects of macroeconom-
ic phenomena like inequality are mediated by
culture-bound belief systems. Even universal
human psychological traits are highly mediat-
ed by diverse human cultural formations. Like
monkeys and chimps, we all eat. But some eat
with fingers, some with forks, and some with
a tuxedoed waiter and violins. There is no
denying that all humans signal status, but the
differences between a silk necktie and a bound
foot are not morally trivial. A high-status
drug-dealing gangster and a high-status barn-
raising Amish family man may each be “alpha
males” within their groups, but the social con-
sequences of positional competition for vio-
lent power and for upstanding modest piety
are hardly the same. 
Indeed, a sensible measure of a culture’s
quality is the extent to which it can shape
potentially destructive natural propensities,
such as self-interest, status seeking, tribal sol-
idarity, and mate competition, into benign or
even beneficial cultural forms.93 Although
our taste for status may be deep, the fact that
our cultural capacity mediates our instincts,
causing the form and value of their expres-
sion to vary wildly, prevents facile extrapola-
tion from tendency to policy. 
This turn toward culture is far from a soft-
headed evasion of hard biological truths.
Cultural flexibility is our biological nature.
Recent work by Peter Richerson, Robert Boyd,
Joseph Henrich (a zoologist and two anthro-
pologists), and others point out the adaptive
advantages of a labile cultural capacity that
allows human populations to adapt quickly to
changing environments and accumulate and
transmit useful knowledge, norms, and insti-
tutions across generations.94 In a paper on the
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cultural evolution of cooperation, Boyd,
Richerson, and Henrich point out that the
common human cultural capacity explains the
huge variation in cooperative institutions and
norms between societies. Whether we happen
to be locked in zero-sum or positive-sum
games is more a matter of culturally transmit-
ted institutions (norms of interaction and
coordination, explicit or tacit) than of brute
facts about our genetic constitution.95 The
question, then, isn’t whether we are status
seeking. The question is how our culture and
institutions harness, suppress, or amplify our
natural tendencies. 
Henrich, with anthropologist and psy-
chologist Francisco Gil-White, has argued
that the distinctive human cultural capacity
creates space for kinds of status based in the
positive-sum trade of specialized knowledge
and expertise for “prestige.” They argue that
freely conferred prestige provides both an
incentive to develop excellence in a valued
domain and a payment for the demonstra-
tion and transmission of scarce knowledge
and skills that benefit members of the group: 
In humans, in contrast [to other pri-
mates], status and its perquisites often
come from non-agonistic sources—in
particular, from excellence in valued
domains of activity, even without any
credible claim to superior force. For
example, paraplegic physicist Stephen
Hawking . . . certainly enjoys high status
throughout the world. Those who, like
Hawking, achieve status by excelling in
valued domains are often said to have
“prestige.”96
It cannot be denied that prestige based in
superior knowledge of theoretical physics is
light-years from that enjoyed by a dominant
vervet monkey tyrannizing its cowering
underlings. Henrich and Gil-White’s concep-
tion of nonagonistic prestige based in valued
excellence points to the exit from Layard and
Frank’s grim, zero-sum world. To be sure, the
runner-up in the race to cure a disease may be
infuriated by the prestige granted to his win-
ning nemesis, but this triviality will be
swamped by the benefits that flow to people
who may not even know the innovator’s name.
The logic is basically David Hume’s in his
essay “The Rise and Progress of the Arts and
Sciences,” where he attributes the advance of
knowledge and beauty precisely to a combina-
tion of “emulation,” the ambition to equal or
surpass others (positional competitiveness),
and a taste for “praise and glory” (freely con-
ferred prestige).97 Hume may well have had
himself in mind when he observed, “A writer is
animated with new force, when he hears the
applauses of the world for his former produc-
tions; and, being roused by such a motive, he
often reaches a pitch of perfection, which is
equally surprising to himself and to his read-
ers.”98 The world is better, not worse, for
Hume’s own avidly status-seeking “love of lit-
erary fame,” his confessed “ruling passion.”99
We applaud for a reason: to stimulate the sup-
ply of excellence by gratifying the demand for
status.
Crucially, there is no limit to the possible
forms of excellence. So, although the number
of positions on any single dimension of sta-
tus may be fixed, there is no reason why
dimensions of status cannot be multiplied
indefinitely. It does not in fact require a vio-
lation of mathematical law to produce more
high-status positions, for it is possible to pro-
duce new status dimensions. 
In his fascinating analysis of the economics
of fame, economist Tyler Cowen interprets
praise as the currency with which fans reward
and manipulate fame-seeking performers, and
concludes, in an argument addressed to Frank,
that fame-seeking is a positive-sum, not a neg-
ative-sum, game. “Given the benefits of trading
praise for performance, markets continually
find new means of accommodating and
attracting fame-seeking,” Cowen writes.100 And
markets continually find new means of accom-
modating and attracting more garden-variety
forms of status-seeking as well.
New dimensions of excellence and status
often open up as a result of technological
innovation. It was impossible to be a chart-
topping pop star or a champion triathalete
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before there were radios and bikes. Liberal
market societies not only create new technolo-
gies, they create proliferating forms of associa-
tion, affiliation, expression, and identity at a
sometimes alarming rate.101 Each musical
genre, hobby, committee, church, club, ideolo-
gy, and lifestyle provides a new dimension—a
new frame of reference—for positional compe-
tition. Environmental purists can compete
with one another to conspicuously consume
eco-friendly products (or conspicuously refuse
to consume much at all), while punk rockers
duke it out on grounds of anti-establishment
authenticity and economics professors knock
themselves silly trying to get articles into eso-
teric journals no one else cares about.
The cultural fragmentation some critics
lament is precisely what liberates us from
unavoidable zero-sum positional conflict.
Surfer dudes don’t compete with Star Trek
geeks for status. Dynamic market liberal soci-
eties create higher-order positive-sum games
(for example, the “create a new status dimen-
sion” game, or the “find the status dimension
on which you rank highest” game) that have
lower-order zero-sum games as parts. 
Once we recognize the anarchic multidi-
mensionality of status, the frequent supposi-
tion of Frank, Layard, Cassidy, and others
that the distribution of income—whether within
the office or within the nation—is the main
dimension of positional competition begins
to look ridiculous. Struggling artists do not
necessarily doubt their superiority in the face
of successful accountants. And it should not
need pointing out that many of us simply
don’t know how much our friends make and
don’t much care. 
Are the external effects of positional com-
petition really like pollution, as Layard says?
Or is positional competition more like the
light of the sun: it can burn you, but nothing
grows without it? Nobel Prize winner Gary
Becker and his University of Chicago col-
league, Clark Medal winner Kevin Murphy,
have argued that without the motivating
prospect of increased status, there would be
“underinvestment” in entrepreneurial activity:
“Great scientists and outstanding entrepre-
neurs receive enormous prestige and status
precisely in order to encourage scientific and
startup activities,” they write.102 The benefits
of such status seeking, they say, may more
than offset the negative effect of status “arms
races.” Even if the taste for relative position is
unavoidable, Indiana University economist
Richmond Harbaugh argues that fear of
falling behind can induce high rates of sav-
ings—a kind of stockpiling for future status-
signaling consumption races—with positive
overall effects on economic growth.103 So,
there may well be negative external effects of
positional competition, but when we add the
positive effects, the net externality may turn
out to be positive. We can draw no sound
implication for policy by blinding ourselves to
one column of the cost-benefit ledger. 
If some positional competition creates neg-
ative spillovers, the best policy solution is less
clear than Frank, Layard, and others imply. In
his seminal 1960 article, “The Problem of
Social Cost,” Ronald Coase destroyed the
older conception of externalities.104 Coase
drew attention to the fact that externalities
exist only as an interaction of preferences. I may
smell of jasmine, to the delight of most who
enter my orbit. But if you are allergic, my fra-
grance may be far from pleasant. A tax on jas-
mine may benefit you, but at the cost of those
who take pleasure in the scent. Coase instructs
us to look for the “least-cost avoider.” If it
costs you least simply to stay out of wafting
distance, then that will be the most efficient
course. 
The cultural variability and open-ended-
ness of status make it clear that we are not
helpless to avoid the harsh side-effects of
positional competition. If it is within our
power to opt out of any particular status race
and to compete for status on a different
dimension, those “harmed” may well be the
least-cost avoiders. Remember Frank’s exam-
ple of competing job applicants in a race to
buy an ever-fancier suit? The fact is, you sim-
ply don’t have to apply for that job. And even
if you really want to, you can always buy your
suit on the cheap from Overstock.com, hope










to buy studio time for your new indie-emo-
folk band—that is, to compete on another
dimension of status. 
More importantly, as Michael Hagerty’s
study discussed above makes clear, although a
plurality of people taking a happiness survey
do determine their answer on the basis of
some kind of concurrent social comparison,
people are easily able to shift their frame of ref-
erence and respond to the survey on the basis
of intertemporal personal comparison, or
intertemporal social comparison, in which
case their self-reported life satisfaction increas-
es. All it takes is for the experimenter to ask
them to look at things a different way. If the
“negative externality” vanishes simply because
people have shifted the perspective from
which they answer a happiness survey ques-
tion, then the idea that there are real “harms”
here, or that the state might have an interest in
preventing them, becomes hard to swallow.
The “harm” appears to be a phantom of an
easily ameliorable bias toward concurrent
social comparison in survey respondents. It’s
hard not to be amused by the “policy implica-
tion” Hagerty draws from his study: 
The intertemporal questions above
show . . . that people are quite willing to
change their standard of comparison
(at least temporarily). National happi-
ness may therefore be increased by
encouraging people to compare them-
selves with their own grandparents, who
had far worse health, education, social
mobility, and job benefits than today,
and who hoped for better lives for their
children. The present study shows that
people currently compare themselves
far less to their own past (as little as
11%) than to current standards such as
social comparisons or current aspira-
tions. Therefore, encouraging people to
compare themselves with their own past
(rather than with current others or cur-
rent aspirations) would increase judg-
ments of happiness.105
The policy implication is not so much that
we ought to stick it to the rich, but to get a
better grasp on how rich we all really are.
Indeed, if we extrapolate from Hagerty, the
happiness-based policy implication of his
study is that we should once again revise the
Consumer Price Index so that it stops under-
estimating growth in real wages.106 We’d be
happier if government statistics didn’t con-
ceal how much better off we really are.
Work by psychologist Bram Buunk shows
that individuals can differ strongly in what
he calls “social comparison orientation” or
SCO. It turns out that it is not good for you
to be high in SCO: 
Individuals high in social comparison
orientation are characterized by a sense
of uncertainty about themselves as well
as by a strong concern with their own
motives and feelings, as apparent from
substantial correlations of social com-
parison orientation with neuroticism,
and with public and private self-con-
sciousness. Moreover, and particularly
relevant here, individuals high in social
comparison orientation are relatively
low in intellectual autonomy (one of
the Big Five dimensions) and tend to
have a strong interest in how others are
doing in order to evaluate their own
characteristics.107
It is well-known that neuroticism in par-
ticular correlates negatively with self-report-
ed happiness, while intellectual autonomy
(also known as “openness to experience”) cor-
relates positively with Ryff ’s “challenged
thriving.”108 People high in SCO feel worse
when others are doing better, while people
low in SCO simply don’t notice. It seems
unwise to create policy that would symboli-
cally endorse and possibly reinforce what
appears to be a psychologically problematic
orientation. And it seems deeply unfair to
raise taxes on everyone simply on the basis of
the fact that some people can’t help compar-
ing themselves to others. Happily, Buunk
and coauthors show that people high in SCO












that there are real
“harms” becomes
hard to swallow. 
tive success: they can be taught to pay more
attention to those doing worse, with divi-
dends in self-reported happiness. Even those
of us most inclined to compare ourselves to
others can reduce the “harms” of relative
position simply by choosing to pay attention
to something else. 
Frank, acknowledging the logic of Coase’s
least-cost avoider principle, argues that even
people who are uninterested in status may be
harmed anyway by others’ positional competi-
tion. For example, “positional externalities in
the housing market,” Frank argues, “also
entail far more tangible costs, most notably
that failure to keep up with community
spending patterns means having to send one’s
children to schools of below average quality.
The scope for accommodation to such costs
seems far more limited” than in cases where
we can simply choose not to let relative posi-
tion bother us or volitionally to switch our
frame of social comparison.109 But this,
Frank’s best example of a case where it is hard
to opt out, is in fact a strikingly poor example.
It turns entirely on the irrational bundling of
schools and neighborhoods in the American
public school system, a problem that could be
entirely alleviated with school choice policies
that would allow families to send their kids to
fancy schools outside their own modest neigh-
borhood. This suggests that the most direct
policy implications of positional competition
may not be higher taxes on work and con-
sumption, but policies, like school choice, that
make it easier to pick and choose among races.
It should be possible to give your kids a leg up
in the education race without living in an
expensive neighborhood. Frank identifies a
cost of the status quo system of education
financing, not a cost of positional competi-
tion in general. 
Getting Rich, Getting Happy
The relative position hypothesis also helps
drive the animus toward economic growth. If
we’re grinding away to get ahead, and every-
body gets richer, but money doesn’t make us
happier, and no one on average gets ahead
anyhow, then what’s the point of everybody
getting richer? What’s the point of a high rate
of GDP growth? We could grind away a lot
less, be a bit less rich, but also a bit happier.
We should relax more instead: build model
airplanes, spend time with the kids, adopt a
highway, or whatever—and policy should
help make this easier. Money isn’t everything,
and there’s something wrong with a govern-
ment that doesn’t seem to understand that. 
“GDP is a hopeless measure of welfare,”
Layard concludes. “For since the [Second
World] War that measure has shot up by
leaps and bounds, while the happiness of the
population has stagnated.”110 Elsewhere he
writes, “We desperately need to replace GDP,
however adjusted, by more subtle measures
of national wellbeing.”111 This also is the
kind of thinking that led Andrew Oswald to
write, “Economists’ faith in the value of
growth is diminishing. That is a good thing
and will slowly make its way down into the
minds of tomorrow’s politicians.”
It has, in fact, made its way to the minds of
today’s politicians. As British prime ministerial
hopeful David Cameron announced last
spring, “It’s time we admitted that there’s
more to life than money, and it’s time we
focused not just on GDP, but on GWB—
General Wellbeing.” In Cameron’s plea one
can hear echoes of Robert Kennedy’s famous
attack on national income accounts as a mea-
sure of human well-being. Stumping for pres-
ident just months before his tragic murder,
Kennedy lamented that a measure like GDP
does not allow for the health of our
children, the quality of their education,
or the joy of their play. It does not
include the beauty of our poetry or the
strength of our marriages; the intelli-
gence of our public debate or the
integrity of our public officials. It mea-
sures neither our wit nor our courage;
neither our wisdom nor our learning;
neither our compassion nor our devo-
tion to our country; it measures every-
thing, in short, except that which
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makes life worthwhile. And it tells us
everything about America except why
we are proud that we are Americans.112
Kennedy was right that national income
statistics don’t tell us much about “our wit” or
“the joy of our children’s play.” Nevertheless, if
we’re looking for a single socioeconomic vari-
able that tracks with most objective indicators
of well-being, GDP per capita is hard to beat.
Even if it does not measure everything that
makes life worthwhile (because nothing does),
it most definitely relates positively to mea-
sures of a lot of good things, including happi-
ness. But before looking at the effects of
money on happiness, I will examine how
important high average individual wealth, as
measured by GDP per capita, can be to non-
subjective indicators of well-being.
A large recent study by OECD economists
Romina Boarini, Asa Johansson, and Marco
Mira d’Ecole focused on the relationship
between GDP per capita and alternative mea-
sures of well-being in the OECD nations. The
authors found significant positive correla-
tions of GDP per capita with self-sufficiency,
average years of schooling, life expectancy at
birth, healthy life expectancy at birth, mortali-
ty risks, and volunteering. Further, GDP per
capita was significantly negatively correlated
with income inequality, relative poverty, child
poverty, and child mortality.113 As economists
Vito Tanzi and Hamid R. Davoodi show, GDP
per capita is also significantly positively corre-
lated with lower levels of corruption—so GDP
may have something to say about the “integri-
ty of our public officials” after all.114
Given the serious charge that high-growth
market societies erode “social capital” and
fray the social fabric, it is important to note
that even if GDP per capita is not significant-
ly positively associated with most indicators
of social cohesion other than rates of volun-
teerism and a decrease in crime, neither does
it appear to accompany symptoms of social
breakdown. According the authors, “indica-
tors of crime victimization, prisoners and
suicides—as well as of divorces, drug use and
road accidents—are not significantly correlat-
ed with GDP per capita,” either positively or
negatively.115
In his recent book, The Moral Consequences of
Economic Growth, Harvard economist Benjamin
Friedman emphasizes that in addition to the
litany of its astonishing humanitarian benefits,
economic growth is also a powerful force for
the encouragement of broadly liberal social
and political aims. “The value of a rising stan-
dard of living lies not just in the concrete
improvements it brings to how individuals
live,” Friedman writes, “but in how it shapes
the social, political, and ultimately moral char-
acter of a people. Economic growth—meaning
a rising standard of living for the clear majori-
ty of citizens—more often than not fosters
greater opportunity, tolerance of diversity,
social mobility, commitment to fairness, and
dedication to democracy.”116
And as Tyler Cowen has detailed at
length, wealthier societies produce more
paintings, poems, films, songs, operas, and
sculptures. They build more museums, sup-
port more symphonies, and patronize more
artists than do less wealthy societies. Econ-
omists can’t tell a skeptic about economic
growth whether the poetry is beautiful, but at
least there is more of it, and most of us,
economists or not, recognize that much of it
is in fact beautiful.117
So economic growth makes us healthier,
better educated, and more public spirited;
fosters social toleration; increases the integri-
ty of our public institutions; and produces a
surfeit of art and culture. But does economic
growth make us happier? 
It is impossible to review the happiness lit-
erature without constantly tripping over the
fact that GDP per capita, or some other proxy
for average wealth, dominates almost all vari-
ables in terms of the strength of correlation
with a society’s average happiness. As we have
already seen, at any time and place, individuals
with higher relative income are more likely to
say they are “very happy.” But, as we are con-
stantly reminded, the idea that average happi-
ness has not increased with average income is











On average, wealthier nations have happi-
er people, as Figure 3 makes clear. Moreover,
the most recent statistical work on the rela-
tionship between wealth and happiness,
using larger sets of data and more sophisti-
cated techniques of analysis, show unequivo-
cally that we are getting happier as we get
richer. 
In a recent debate with Richard Easterlin
in the journal Social Indicators Research,
Michael Hagerty and Ruut Veenhoven have
argued that increasing wealth is making us
happier. Much of the debate centers on small
esoteric points of statistical methodology
and how to rhetorically frame the conclu-
sions. However, Veenhoven and Hagerty’s
methods do appear to be a marked improve-
ment over most past happiness studies, and
their well-argued interpretation of their find-
ings goes mostly unchallenged by Easterlin,
which augurs ill for the anti-growth crowd.
They argue that the data are inconsistent
with the predictions of strong relative posi-
tion theories and that although adaptation
does reduce the rate of increase in happiness,
it does not wash out all absolute gains in
happiness from increasing wealth.118 There
are non-relative and non-evaporating gains
from wealth. They conclude:
Happiness is apparently not a zero-sum
game and can be raised by growth in
national income. This has been a central
but until recently untested belief of
economists and public policy analysts.
Not too long ago unhappiness was
deemed the normal human condition.
Since expulsion from Paradise, humans
could only hope for happiness in the
after-life. Promises of greater happiness
in earthly existence were dismissed as







Life Satisfaction and GDP per capita
Source: Tomi Ovaska and Ryo Takashima, “Economic Policy and the Level of Self-Perceived Well-Being: An
International Comparison,” Journal of Socio-Economics 35 (2006).
rent research on happiness allows empir-
ical tests of this, and has shown that
entire nations can become happier with
economic growth and its covariates.119
Happiness researchers have mostly told us
about average self-reported happiness at a
particular time and over time. But we have
been told little about how long a representa-
tive person in a society can expect to live at
the average level of happiness. For example,
most cross-national comparative studies
can’t see the difference between two equally
happy societies, one of which has an average
lifespan of 30 years and the other of which
has an average of 80. But if we’re making
judgments on the standard of happiness
alone, a society in which you can expect an
extra 50 years of happiness has got to be bet-
ter. Veenhoven’s HLY measure takes longevi-
ty into account. His method is to take a
nation’s life-expectancy at birth and multiply
it by average happiness converted to a scale
from 0 to 1 (e.g., a 5 on a 10-point happiness
scale becomes .5, etc.). When we switch to the
HLY indicator for the United States, we see
HLY levels clearly rising during the last half
of the 20th century. If a longer happy life is
happier than a shorter happy life, then life is
evidently getting happier with growth (see
Figure 4).
The exact effect of rising wealth on the
trend of rising HLY is difficult to tease out, as
GDP per capita tends to correlate with so
many other positive indicators. Veenhoven
shows that the gains in HLY do diminish
rapidly (but never to zero) above about
$15,000 of average income (see Figure 5).
However, the returns to HLY from economic
and political freedom do not appear to be
diminishing, and these are the variables that
tend to predict growth. 
As Veenhoven shows in Table 2, purchas-
ing power per head is the strongest single
determinant of HLY. The fact that correla-
tions for all other indicators (with the excep-
tion of “trust in compatriots”) weaken after
controlling for wealth suggests that wealth
and growth explain, at least in part, the levels
of other positive social conditions, such as
freedom, tolerance, civil rights, lower levels of
corruption, discrimination against women,
and inequality in happiness—strongly sup-
porting Benjamin Friedman’s argument for
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Happiness Adjusted Life-Years in the United States 1948–1998
Source: Ruut Veenhoven, “Apparent Quality-of-Life In Nations: How Long and Happy People Live,” Social
Indicators Research 71 (2005): 61–86.
the broadly liberalizing effects of economic
growth.120
The best studies are those that track peo-
ple over time and see what happens to their
happiness as their circumstances change. One
such study used the reunification of East and
West Germany—and rapidly rising incomes in
the East—as a kind of natural experiment to
test whether increasing incomes do make us
happier. In a paper titled “Money Does
Matter!” the authors write:
average life satisfaction in East
Germany increased by around 20%
between 1991 and 2001, leading to a
clear convergence with West Germany.
Importantly, increased real household
incomes in East Germany accounted
for around 35–40% of this increase,
which corresponds to the economists’
view that money surely matters.121
On the flip-side, sudden reductions in
income correlate strongly with declining sub-
jective well-being. Hagerty and Veenhoven
note that “in Russia average happiness
decreased by two points following the Rubel
crisis in the mid 1990s, which severely disor-
ganized the economy. As the Russian econo-
my began to pick up, so happiness also began
to rise.”122
Despite the apparently overwhelming evi-
dence that wealthy, high-growth societies are
the happiest places in the world, and only get-
ting happier, there is no lack of hand-wringing
about the spiritual emptiness of “materialism”
in liberal market societies, and some of the
hand-wringing is motivated by putatively sci-
entific findings. In his 2004 book The High
Price of Materialism, Knox College psychologist
Tim Kasser presents his research with Richard
Ryan showing that “extrinsically motivated”
people who care predominantly about materi-
al acquisition are more likely to find them-
selves unhappy and dissatisfied with life than
are “intrinsically motivated” people devoted to
personally meaningful work and relation-
ships. Kasser’s research on the negative effects
of “materialistic” value orientation on happi-
ness seems sound and conforms to common
sense. 
However, Kasser barely takes a breath
before taking an awesome leap in logic from










Wealth and Happy Life-Years in 66 Countries in the 1990s
Source: Ruut Veenhoven, “Apparent Quality-of-Life In Nations: How Long and Happy People Live,” Social
Indicators Research 71 (2005): 61–86.
Because extrinsically motivated individuals
with predominantly materialistic values are
more likely to be unhappy, market societies,
which create unparalleled opportunities for
material accumulation and consumption and
which motivate the production of goods and
services others value extrinsically with profits
and paychecks, must be unhappy.123 But this
is a simple non sequitur. Kasser boldly equivo-
cates on the meaning of the word “materialis-
tic,” implying that consumer demand for
material consumption requires a widespread
“materialistic” attitude in his special theoreti-
cal sense. However, capitalist consumer soci-
eties—and markets in general—don’t require
materialistic monomania in order to operate.
They require only that people want things, for
good reasons or bad, and that they are willing
to trade what they have produced to get them.
Showing that there is a problem with materi-
alistic monomania says nothing about capital-
ist societies, nor does it imply that denizens of
capitalism are more likely to be materialistic
than others.
Recent studies by Stephanie M. Bryant,
Dan Stone, and Benson Weir have developed
a new theoretical construct called Financial
Self-Efficacy, which they define as “the belief
that one can competently manage one’s
finances.”124 The authors find that individu-
als high in FSE are more likely to treat money
as an instrument for the achievement of other,
nonmaterialistic aims. People high in FSE
tend to have higher levels of debt but more
intrinsic motivation for carrying it (e.g., a stu-
dent loan, a family home, a trip to a foreign
country, etc.), and they are more likely to
have high levels of life satisfaction. The
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Social Conditions and Happy-Life-Years in 67 Countries in the 1990s
Correlation with HLY
Condition in Nation Zero-order Wealth Controlled N
Wealth
Purchasing power per head* +0.73 66
Freedom
Economic* +0.71 +0.38 64
Political* +0.53 +0.13 63
Personal –0.61 +0.31 45
Equality
Disparity in incomes* –0.10 +0.37 62
Discrimination of women –0.46 –0.12 51
Disparity in happiness –0.64 –0.37 54
Brotherhood
Tolerance +0.72 +0.43 55
Trust in compatriots +0.20 +0.20 37
Voluntary work +0.40 +0.31 53
Social security +0.34 –0.27 34
Justice
Rule of law* +0.65 +0.20 64
Respect of civil rights* +0.60 +0.20 60
Corruption –0.73 –0.32 40
Explained variance by variables 
marked with* 66% 60
Source: Ruut Veenhoven, “Apparent Quality-of-Life In Nations: How Long and Happy People Live,” Social
Indicators Research 71 (2005): 61–86.
upshot is clear: the aspiration to make and
spend money is neither good nor bad. What
matters is our attitude toward our financial
goals, and their content. If we want money
simply for its own sake, to impress friends, or
to buy gadgets as palliatives for boredom and
ennui—Kasser’s “materialism”—money won’t
do us good. But if we regard money as a mere
tool with which to achieve more meaningful
ends, more money will help us do more of
what we find meaningful. 
University of Michigan political scientist
Ronald Inglehart’s work shows that nations
with a rising level of per-capita GDP tend to shift
culturally from “materialist” values, “which
emphasize economic and physical security,” to
“post-materialist” values, “which emphasize self-
expression and quality of life.”125 According to
Inglehart, the cultural shift includes a signifi-
cant time lag, because “to a large extent, one’s
basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed
during one’s pre-adult years.”126 Inglehart finds
that there has been a large shift from materialist
to post-materialist values in wealthy Western lib-
eral market democracies.
For example, in the earliest U.S. survey,
materialists outnumbered postmateri-
alists by 24 percentage points; in West
Germany, they outnumbered postma-
terialists by 34 points. During the three
decades following 1970, a major shift
occurred: by the 1999–2001 surveys,
postmaterialists had become more
numerous than materialists in all nine
countries.127
This, of course does not mean that
younger generations spend all their time
shopping for “fair trade” coffee and perform-
ing sun salutations (though there is surely
more of that). But the shift away from eco-
nomic scarcity increases the emphasis on self-
definitional and self-expressive consumption.
“The rise of postmaterialism does not mean
that materialistic issues vanish,” Inglehart
and Christian Welzel write: 
The publics in postindustrial societies
have developed more sophisticated
forms of consumerism, materialism,
and hedonism. . . . New forms of con-
sumption no longer function primari-
ly to indicate people’s economic class.
Increasingly, they are means of individ-
ual self-expression.128
Inglehart is not using “materialist” in pre-
cisely the same way as Kasser, but the rough
idea—an emphasis on material acquisition as
opposed to meaning—is the same. If you
want fewer materialists, the way to go is to
make more material readily available to peo-
ple, at which point they’ll stop worrying
about it so much and start worrying instead
about things like happiness and the meaning
of life. 
Many people seem to think that a govern-
ment’s emphasis on measurements like GDP
indicate a kind of collective affirmation of
materialist goals, encouraging a narrowly
materialist attitude at war with more exalted
values. But this is simply a mistake. The very
function of money is to serve as a neutral
medium of exchange. It is a shape-shifting
embodiment of almost any value. The same
$100 can be spent on a prostitute or donated
to an HIV/AIDS clinic. The relative value
neutrality of money is precisely why the mea-
surement of per-capita wealth is well suited
to pluralistic liberal societies; it doesn’t beg
many questions about competing concep-
tions of the good life. Money can’t be con-
verted into anything that someone might
value, but it is of the nature of money to be
convertible into a phenomenally broad range
of values. Societies with high levels of average
income and wealth are societies in which peo-
ple have more resources at their disposal to
achieve their aims, no matter what those
aims might be, which is why it should be no
surprise that, other things equal, people with
more money are more satisfied. By measur-
ing GDP, household wealth, and the like,
government is not affirming one set of values
over others. It is, in fact, embodying an ideal
of liberal neutrality by measuring something
that is valuable in varying degrees to all of us. 
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meaning of life. 
Conclusion
The United States is not failing the
Founders’ test. The happiness-based evidence
points unambiguously to the conclusion that
those of us lucky enough to live in the United
States in 2007 are succeeding fairly well in the
pursuit of happiness. Whether or not our
Founders would recognize—or even like—their
country, Americans are indeed living up to the
promise of our founding. 
So, we are left with a puzzle. If we’re so
happy, then why are we so ready to be per-
suaded by claims that we are suffering from a
world-historical spiritual malaise, despite all
the evidence to the contrary?
In his bestselling 2004 book The Paradox of
Choice, Schwartz argues that capitalist con-
sumer culture gets us down by offering too
many choices. It’s not just that the onslaught
of new brands of toothpaste, breakfast cereal,
chocolate bars, and books about happiness
taxes our frail deliberative capacities, but when
our set of options explodes, each new choice
requires not choosing so many other things.129
The perceived cost of making any choice and
sticking with it seems higher and higher the
more alternatives there are to forgo. On this
score, Schwartz points us to Robert Lane’s
claim in The Loss of Happiness in Market
Democracies: 
There are too many life choices . . .
without concern for the resulting over-
load; and the lack of constraint by cus-
tom, [and] demands for self-actualiza-
tion, that is, demands to discover or
create rather than accept a given iden-
tity . . . all adds to the stress.”130
To be sure, it is a hassle to have to discover
or create our identities instead of being
“given” one—or having one forced upon us.
But this is, in essence, what it means to be
postmaterialist in Inglehart’s sense. Instead of
slipping into pre-assigned, traditional social
roles, we are able to sit atop mountains of
wealth and survey the vast horizon of possibil-
ity, with a heretofore unthinkable indepen-
dence from custom, wondering what kind of
person we would like to be. And then we
become agoraphobic. 
Our problem is that there are both too
many and too few choices. There are particu-
lar goods that would specially benefit and
satisfy each of us, but which don’t exist. Yet it
is hard to identify the specially fitting goods
that already do exist in the panoply of choice.
If we weren’t so diverse, we wouldn’t require
so much diversity. One kind of shoe, one
kind of bread, one kind of antacid would be
universally satisfactory. But we are diverse,
and, for the first time in history, we are liber-
ated from ancient demands of conformity,
because, for the first time in history, we now
come into the world at a sufficiently safe dis-
tance from scarcity to permit us to express
and experiment with our singular natures. In
fine post-materialist fashion, we demand
that our consumption express our self-con-
ceptions-in-progress, and so we need diversity.
But we also don’t know exactly who we want
to be before we get to the store. So we can eas-
ily feel lost in the consumer cornucopia, as
though we are sorting through a landfill for
a diamond etched with just our name. 
As John Maynard Keynes wrote in his star-
tlingly prescient essay “Economic Possibilities
for Our Grandchildren,” there may be a sense
in which we have already solved (we lucky few
in the advanced liberal democracies, that is)
the economic problem of scarcity. But then
what?
Thus for the first time since his creation
man will be faced with his real, his per-
manent problem, how to use his free-
dom from pressing economic cares,
how to occupy the leisure, which science
and compound interest will have won
for him, to live wisely and agreeably and
well.131
And this, our permanent problem, we have yet
to solve, and it weighs on us. Our culture has
not yet caught up to the new, happier world of












yet see how our inherited visions of the good
life fit into it. So it seems plausible to most of
us that something is wrong, even if so much is
right. If happiness research is going to be good
for anything, it is not going to be for guiding
well-meaning technocrats who seek to make
us happier by pulling this policy lever or push-
ing that policy button. Rather it is going to be
good for providing insight in how “to live
wisely and agreeably and well.” This is insight
we all badly need, and it is not the govern-
ment’s to give. 
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